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INTRODUCTION 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina,1 there is a vast and sprawling market-
place that sprang up just as the peace accords were going into effect, 
bringing to some conclusion three-and-a-half years of bloody ethnic 
fighting.  The place is called Arizona Market, and it was created, fos-
tered, and supported by the international community (IC)2—hyped as 
a shining example of capitalism and evidence of the positive impact of 
the particular type of political and economic engineering that takes 
place with internationally assisted postwar reconstruction.  But even 
while Arizona Market was supported by the IC, it was also a place 
where men from the region would bring women to be bought and 
sold like chattel alongside drugs, weapons, bootleg media, and knock-
off athletic gear. 
The proliferation of narratives about what Arizona Market truly 
represents belies the market’s short and unglamorous existence—the 
market is a mere thirty-five acres in size, only fourteen years old, and 
host to thousands of flea-market stalls.  Many of the internationals 
present during the early days after the Dayton Peace Accords—mostly 
military, diplomatic, and humanitarian actors—pointed to Arizona 
Market as the one place in Bosnia where Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks3 
1 The name of the country is Bosnia and Herzegovina, abbreviated BiH, but this 
Article will use the shorthand “Bosnia” to refer to the entire country. 
2 The term “IC” is often used to describe internationals working for military, dip-
lomatic, humanitarian, or other international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
working on and funding postconflict reconstruction programs. 
3 The term “Bosniak,” also spelled “Bosniac,” is used to refer to a Bosnian citizen 
who is neither ethnically Serb nor Croat and who may be, but is not always, Muslim. 
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peaceably interacted.  As they protected the market and funded its 
expansion, these internationals spun stories about their hopes for its 
ability to bring about peaceful relations between warring ethnicities 
through the neutrality of commerce, notwithstanding the fact that 
peace was hard to come by in the rest of Bosnia.  The international ac-
tors then extrapolated from this perceived success, stating that the 
success of Arizona Market in achieving interethnic harmony was an 
example of how the free market could overcome ethnic disharmony 
in greater Bosnia and perhaps anywhere in the world.  For quite some 
time, the IC ignored the fact that women were being sold in the mar-
ketplace, like slaves at auction, to be sent to brothels all over the re-
gion and beyond.  The IC turned a blind eye to the trafficking, even 
though (or perhaps because) some of its members were themselves 
purchasing and selling women for sex and other indentured services.  
When stories began emerging outside of Bosnia about human traffick-
ing emanating from the hub of Arizona Market, the narrative abruptly 
changed.  Suddenly, Arizona Market was described as a dark and see-
dy place, full of corruption and hidden, nefarious criminal activity. 
The narratives surrounding Arizona Market are conflicting, but 
perhaps they all hold some truth.  Arizona Market was in fact a place 
to buy the goods necessary for daily survival when there were none to 
be found elsewhere in decimated postwar Bosnia, but it was also a 
place to buy human beings to satisfy the sexual demands of the inter-
nationals.  It remains a dark place, laden with black market activity 
and organized crime, even after the eventual taxation of goods pass-
ing through Arizona Market funded the democratic success story of 
Brcko, the town in whose shadow Arizona Market sits. 
This Article employs the example of Arizona Market to illustrate 
some of the harms that emanate from the politico-economic engineer-
ing that takes place in early phases of postconflict reconstruction, in 
particular the harms that befall women.  Part I examines the creation 
of Arizona Market, exploring the intentions of the various actors in-
volved.  Part II analyzes the activities that took place in Arizona Market 
and how the market’s evolution was affected by local, regional, na-
tional, and international politics.  Part III examines the negative im-
pacts of those activities on women, the emergence of human traffick-
ing, and the general disregard for women in the peacemaking, peace-
building, and reconstruction processes in Bosnia.  It also looks more 
deeply at the effects of neoliberal policies and projects on women.  
Part IV concludes with some observations about the problems inhe-
rent in postconflict reconstruction and internationally assisted eco-
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nomic transition.  It also questions the soundness of practices that as-
sume capitalism and free market ideology as necessary or inherent 
components of democratization, human rights, and the rule of law, 
especially when one result is the disempowerment of women and the 
creation of a market for trafficking in human beings. 
I.  ARIZONA MARKET IN CONTEXT 
As the war ended and the IC descended upon Bosnia, the country 
was not only transitioning from war to peace; it was also transitioning 
from communism to democracy and from a socialist to a privatized, 
capitalist (some would say neoliberalized) economy.4  Admittedly, this 
combination of circumstances is somewhat rare in the postconflict re-
construction context.  Nonetheless, this Article illustrates the risks of 
assuming that democratization and market liberalization are de facto 
the best postconflict transitional options, regardless of what the pre-
conflict political and economic systems were. 
A.  Postwar Bosnia 
The war in Bosnia formally concluded in December 1995 with the 
signing in Dayton, Ohio, of the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.5  The Framework is a document re-
flecting the modern interventionist prescription for peacemaking and 
postconflict reconstruction.  It set forth not just the conditions for se-
curing peace but also specified the programs deemed essential to sus-
4 Prewar Bosnia had a socialist economy in which most firms were owned and con-
trolled by the workers and not the state.  But the IC, via the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), had already begun imposing economic liberalization 
requirements on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after the death of Tito in 
1980.  Similarly, Bosnia had already begun taking steps toward holding free and demo-
cratic elections before the start of the war.  Cf. CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 116-17 (2000) (discussing how international intervention in con-
flicts leads to sustained international involvement and imposition of international 
views of governance).  See generally Dina Francesca Haynes, The Deus ex Machina Des-
cends:  The Laws, Priorities and Players Central to the International Administration of Post-
Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina (outlining the pervasive changes imposed by interna-
tional forces following the war), in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION 3, 4-6 
(Dina Francesca Haynes ed., 2008); Stef Jansen, “Home” and Return in the Foreign Inter-
vention in Bosnia and Herzegovina:  An Anthropological Critique (arguing that neoliberal 
and capitalist structures imposed upon Bosnia were both destabilizing to the preexist-
ing culture and “woefully incomplete”), in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, 
supra, at 29, 41-44. 
5 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & 
Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter Framework]. 
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taining peace.6  It went far beyond a mere cease-fire agreement, creat-
ing roles for the short- and long-term involvement of the IC in the 
litical, legal, and economic institution building of the country after 
the conflict. 
The four-year war in Bosnia decimated its fledgling economy, which 
had begun making the economic transition from socialism to capitalism 
after the death of Tito,7 before the war began.  In 1990, two years before 
the siege of Sarajevo began, Bosnia had a GDP of $11 billion and per 
capita income of $2400.8  By 1995, at the time of the cease-fire, GDP 
had fallen to $2 billion and per capita income was estimated at $500.9  
By the end of the war, between seventy and eighty percent of the popu-
lation was unemployed.10  Those who did work were employed by go-
vernmental entities (e.g., police, schools, and municipal govern-
ments)—jobs awarded according to political party affiliation and 
ethnicity.11  Of the unemployed at the conclusion of the war, some were 
fortunate enough to find employment with international organizations 
over the following few years.  But reliance on the IC for employment 
created an extremely polarized economy and labor market in which 
most people worked either for the local government or the interna-
tional administrative government.12  It also created an economy falsely 
supported and driven by the international presence. 
6 See generally Haynes, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining that the IC wanted to ensure 
through the Dayton Accords that all refugees and displaced persons could return home). 
7 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
8 See Int’l Progress Org., Rebuilding Bosnia-Herzegovina:  Achievements and Diffi-
culties, http://i-p-o.org/rebuilding-bosnia.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
9 See id.; cf. THE WORLD BANK, BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA—COUNTRY BRIEF 2009 
(2009), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/ 
BOSNIAHERZEXTN/0,,menuPK:362036~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK: 
362026,00.html. 
10 See Int’l Progress Org., supra note 8; see also VESNA BOJICIC-DŽELILOVIC ET AL., 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA—UNDERSTANDING REFORM 3 (2004), available at http:// 
www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/GDN_UnderstandingReform_BosniaHerzegovina.pdf. 
11 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:  BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2000), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/321.htm (“[M]any viewed 
membership in the leading party of any given area as the surest way . . . to obtain, re-
gain, or keep . . . jobs in the state-owned sector of the economy.”). 
12 In an odd gender twist, the majority of locals hired by international organiza-
tions were women.  This was not only because women were perceived to have better 
administrative or “secretarial” skills but also because more women had studied the so-
cial sciences and the English language, skills that were particularly sought after by in-
ternational organizations, the United Nations (U.N.), and the military.  This disparity 
in the types of jobs held by men (international men held the large majority of high-
level positions within international organizations) and women (the majority of whom 
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The black market had thrived during the war, with black marketeers 
selling illegal arms, cigarettes, food staples, and identity documents, and 
engaging in all types of smuggling.  It was not dismantled after the Day-
ton Framework was signed.  Rather, the black marketeers and smugglers 
employed the same skills and smuggling routes they had devised during 
the war13 and simply began dealing in different goods—from flour, track 
suits, and cigarettes to drugs, weapons, and human beings.14 
B.  The First Myth of the Free Market:  Achieving Ethnic  
Harmony Through Market Forces 
[The Arizona Market] became the model for the rest of Bosnia for stimulating 
economic activity and establishing a potential for economic reintegration. 
Colonel Greg Fontenot, U.S. Army (Ret.)
15
 
 
At the Arizona Market, stall owners and patrons come from all of Bos-
nia’s ethnic groups, and even across borders from neighboring Croatia 
and Serbia to sell goods and find deals. . . . On a daily basis, Bosniaks, 
Serbs, and Croats interact, socialize, exchange information and some-
times discover how similar they really are. 
U.S. Agency for International Development
16
 
were local administrative staff) created inflated potential for sexual harassment and an 
extreme power differential.  For more on the gender disparity in hiring among inter-
national organizations and attendant sexual harassment problems, see Dina Francesca 
Haynes, Ethics of International Civil Service:  A Reflection on How the Care of United Nations’ 
Staff Impacts the Ability to Fulfill Their Role in “Harmonizing” the World, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. 
L. & POL’Y 175, 209-12 (2008), and Madeleine Rees, International Intervention in Bosnia-
Herzegovina:  The Cost of Ignoring Gender, in THE POSTWAR MOMENT:  MILITARIES, MAS-
CULINITIES AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING:  BOSNIA AND THE NETHERLANDS 51, 57-
58 (Cynthia Cockburn & Dubravka Zarkov eds., 2002).  In fact, I recall more than one 
meeting at which I and Rees were the only international women in senior positions at a 
table full of men, with local Bosnian women sitting in chairs around the edges of the 
walls, serving as administrative assistants. 
13 These routes had arguably existed for hundreds of years.  See Aida A. Hozic, The 
Balkan Merchants:  Changing Borders and Informal Transnationalization, 5 ETHNOPOLITICS 
243, 245-49 (2006) (documenting the origin of the trade routes during the Ottoman 
Empire and their resurgence at various points over the centuries).  
14 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Subcomm. on Democratic Governance, Organized 
Crime—Drug and Human Trafficking in Europe, paras. 11-13, 15-16, 141 CCDG 03 E. rev. 1 
(Nov. 9, 2003) (prepared by Christine Boutin), available at http://www.nato-
pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=368 (recording trafficking of narcotics, including he-
roin, ecstasy, and cannabis, and human trafficking on a large scale throughout Europe). 
15 Greg Fontenot, The Urban Area During Stability Missions Case Study:  Bosnia-
Herzegovina (pt. 1), in CAPITAL PRESERVATION:  PREPARING FOR URBAN OPERATIONS IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY app. F at 211-12 (Russell W. Glenn ed., 2001). 
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The ethnic hatred all share is put aside in the interests of need and econom-
ic gain, both powerful counteractive agents when it comes to prejudice. 
Charles G. Boyd, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
17
 
 
In this atmosphere—with black market activity rampant—Arizona 
Market sprang to life, fueled by a need for the goods necessary for daily 
survival and by the economic, political, and legal vacuum that existed in 
the days and months after the cease-fire.  At first, the market consisted 
of a handful of ramshackle stalls situated along a road known by the in-
ternational military as Arizona Route.  Named by the American unit of 
the international Stabilization Forces (SFOR) who primarily used and 
patrolled it,18 Arizona Route linked the towns of Doboj in the Serb enti-
ty (the Republika Srpska)19 and Tuzla in the Bosnian-Croat entity (the 
Federation), where the U.S. forces were headquartered.20 
While the IC may or may not have actually created Arizona Mar-
ket,21 it certainly emboldened the marketeers who were setting up 
shop there.  The IC initially ignored the marketeers’ presence despite 
regularly patrolling the area and later encouraged their presence 
through passive protection and by spending wages in the market.  Fi-
nally, the IC burnished the international reputation of the black mar-
ket activity taking place within Arizona Market until it took on a luster 
of free market legitimacy that it had not earned.  From the beginning, 
the international refrain was that while the rest of Bosnia was mired in 
ethnic hatred, men (not women) of different ethnic groups happily 
interacted in Arizona Market with business as their neutral ground.22 
16 BENJAMIN FEIT & MICHAEL MORFIT, A NEUTRAL SPACE 3 (n.d.) (on file with author). 
17 Charles G. Boyd, Making Bosnia Work, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 42, 52.  
18 For the first two to three years after the war, roads that crossed former fron-
tlines or divided entities were not frequented by civilians, who feared attack and re-
prisal when their license plates identified them as being from particular parts of the 
country and therefore potentially linked to particular ethnic groups.  Many of these 
roads were used primarily or only by internationals. 
19 The “Republika Srpska” was “created” in early 1992 by indicted war criminal 
Radovan Karadžic’s party, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and then proclaimed 
itself to be part of Yugoslavia (Serbia) rather than Bosnia.  See LAURA SILBER ET AL., 
THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA 218 (rev. ed. 1996). 
20 See Associated Press, U.S. Troops Mark End of Mission in Bosnia, WASH. POST, Nov. 
25, 2004, at A19. 
21 See infra notes 23-27. 
22 Cf. Fontenot, supra note 15, at 211-12.  
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In fact, the IC got it wrong in many respects.  Although men of 
different ethnic groups did do business there, as often as not they 
were not even from Bosnia, undermining the claim that the market 
would create interethnic harmony amongst Bosnians.  Rather, Serbs 
from Serbia; Croats from Croatia; and internationals from Romania, 
Moldova, and Bulgaria were the groups actually taking advantage of 
the unregulated market by engaging in mutually beneficial organized 
crime and smuggling.  The myth that Arizona Market was the venue in 
which Bosnian citizens were finally interacting peaceably after years of 
warring with one another is at best an extreme exaggeration.  But this 
is not the only myth surrounding Arizona Market. 
In Bosnia, there are conflicting narratives about most things hav-
ing to do with the war—who started it, when, where, how, and why23—
and the story of how Arizona Market was created is no exception.  
One narrative says that the market sprang up spontaneously in the 
months after Dayton as a motley collection of vendors servicing North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping troops.24  The In-
ternational Forces (IFOR), supplied by NATO countries and a precur-
sor to SFOR, patrolled the area and established security checkpoints, 
which were critical given the location of the market where Bosnian, 
Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb interests—and territories—
converged.25  Because the area was relatively safe thanks to the IFOR 
patrols, people began coming to “exchange cows and other goods.”26  
Another version of the narrative says that the American unit of IFOR 
affirmatively established the market as a secure trading area during 
the conflict based on the belief that it would be crucial to the stability 
of the region.27 
23 See Dina Francesca Haynes, Introduction to DECONSTRUCTING THE RECON-
STRUCTION, supra note 4, at xv-xviii (introducing some of the variations in the narra-
tives of the war). 
24 See, e.g., PETER ANDREAS, BLUE HELMETS AND BLACK MARKETS:  THE BUSINESS OF 
SURVIVAL IN THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO 133-34 (2008) (stating that the market emerged near 
peacekeeping troop stations and a former NATO checkpoint as well as several brothels). 
25 The strategic importance of the location of the market is discussed further be-
low.  See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text. 
26 See ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 133 (quoting a spokesperson for the Brcko District 
Office of the High Representative (OHR)).    
27 See Alex Jeffrey, Building State Capacity in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina:  The 
Case of Brcko District, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 203, 216 (2006) (claiming that IFOR troops es-
tablished the market during the conflict and that it was subsequently privatized in 2001 
by an Italian-Bosnian company (citing Peter Andreas, The Clandestine Political Economy of 
War and Peace in Bosnia, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 29, 46 (2004))); see also ANDREAS, supra note 
24, at 134 (“The market was encouraged . . . . One way to move forward in the post war 
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Regardless of how it actually started, because of its proximity to 
Brcko and America’s investment in the Dayton Framework and later 
Brcko itself, the market was immediately hailed as a sign of multieth-
nic cooperation.  The hyperbole was then further exaggerated by the 
international actors, who were primarily experts in military operations 
and political science, not economics.  They saw a link between com-
merce and multiethnic interaction and quickly determined that war-
ring ethnicities would set aside old animosities in favor of making 
money—it was the neoliberal free market concept embodied in the 
perfect microcosm of Arizona Market.28 
The United States provided financial support for the market, with 
the Pentagon donating $40,000 toward its establishment.29  In recogni-
tion of its contribution, a plaque thanking the U.S. Army was posted 
publicly at Arizona Market, where it remained until it later became an 
embarrassment and was removed.  By 1998, three years after the for-
mal conclusion of the war, Arizona Market offered DVDs pirated in 
China, goods looted from the ransacked homes of ethnically displaced 
persons, building materials stolen from intergovernmental organiza-
tions (IGOs) that had donated them to rebuild homes, fake Nike 
running shoes, heroin, and human slaves.30 
years was to use business as a foundation.  To use an American phrase, the market was in 
‘everyone’s interest.’” (quoting Michael Montgomery of the Brcko District OHR)). 
28 This myopia can be ascribed, as David Kanin puts it, to “the mythology of the be-
nign, universal applicability of democracy and free markets.”  David B. Kanin, Big Men, 
Corruption, and Crime, 40 INT’L POL. 491, 492 (2003).  Although he goes on to argue that 
by endorsing this mythology, the IC fails to seriously confront corruption and economic 
criminal activity, he characterizes this mythology as created by western imperialism be-
cause “Europeans (and Americans) believe themselves to be ‘ahead’ of the rest of the 
world and authorized to judge how far behind others happen to be.”  Id. at 493. 
29 See Gina Cavallaro, The Lessons Learned in Bosnia and How They Apply to Iraq, AIR 
FORCE TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, available at http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/ 
1-292925-543796.php (quoting Major General William Nash, who explained that the 
Pentagon had paid some of the Arizona Market start-up costs because “the area was 
secure so Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs could all come and do business without fear of 
ethnic violence . . . . Over the years the Arizona Market has had an up and down exis-
tence with some issues of black marketing, trafficking in literally drug [sic], sex and 
rock and roll.”). 
30 See Philip Sherwell, Guns, Girls, Drugs, Fake Track Suits—It’s All Here in the Wildest 
Market in the World, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 19, 2000, at 35, available at 
Factiva (explaining that Arizona Market “has become a byword not just for business 
but also for crime”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HOPES BETRAYED:  TRAFFICKING OF 
WOMEN AND GIRLS TO POST-CONFLICT BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FOR FORCED PROSTI-
TUTION 62-63 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/bosnia/ 
Bosnia1102.pdf (providing sworn testimony of U.S. government contractors who pur-
chased prostitutes at Arizona Market); Dina Francesca Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested 
and Deported:  Extending Immigration Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure 
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The nefarious market became so well-known in the region for be-
ing both unregulated and protected that Albanians, Moldovans, Ro-
manians, and others also came there to conduct their business.  Ari-
zona Market had gone international, becoming “a cross-communal 
trading place in no-man’s land where ethnic belonging and citizen-
ship mattered little and everything was for sale.”31 
Even if the IC did not literally create the market, they funded it 
and imbued it with a powerful myth—that the market was a micro-
cosm of how all of Bosnia could be, with the free market correcting 
even the sort of ethnic hatred that leads to violent war.  The people 
on the ground—primarily military actors presumably present for their 
military, and not their economic, skills—held to the belief that 
[i]n the microcosm the Arizona Market represents may lie a clue to 
building a functioning multiethnic society in Bosnia.  At least for now, 
people feel secure only when surrounded by their own kind.  But as eco-
nomic opportunity invites interaction, these same people will gradually 
become confident that they can live again in a mixed society.
32
 
There were multiple problems with this Pollyanna view of Arizona 
Market.  In addition to being economically flawed, particularly be-
cause it ignores the female portion of the population,33 this view ig-
nores the fact that many of the market’s activities were both illegal 
and extraordinarily abusive.  Even the relatively “victimless” black 
market sales were harmful because they avoided taxation in a country 
that sorely needed a tax base.34  Worse still, the market was tolerated 
by precisely the people whose job it was to guide Bosnia toward a fair, 
structured, and rehabilitated rule-of-law system—the IC. 
In the years following the peace accords, the example of Arizona 
Market continued to be trotted out by the IC to bolster support for 
continued funding of projects related to economic liberalization and 
the return and reintegration of displaced persons, and to stave off the 
growing arguments that Bosnia might be better off as an ethnically di-
the Prosecution of Traffickers, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 221, 222 (2004) (describing the plight of a 
sixteen-year-old Moldovan girl who was sold as a prostitute at Arizona Market). 
31 Florian Bieber, Local Institutional Engineering:  A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and  
Brcko, 12 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 420, 421 (2005). 
32 Boyd, supra note 17, at 52-53.  
33 See infra Section III.C (considering the exclusion of women from reconstruction 
efforts). 
34 See R. Jeffrey Smith, Bosnian Mart Becomes Den of Criminal Enterprise, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 26, 1999, at A33 (explaining that by 1999, Bosnia was losing “an estimated $30 
million a year from untaxed sales of legal goods” in Arizona Market).  
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vided country.35  Eventually, this belief that market forces would pre-
vail and correct years of ethnic hatred led the IC to turn a blind eye to 
the gruesome activity taking place within the market.36  Human be-
ings, in this case exclusively women and children,37 were being sold.  
Buyers purchased not just the services of prostitutes but human beings 
wholesale—people were sold as slaves.  Human beings were treated as 
mere commodities.  Was this to be viewed as an acceptable collateral 
consequence of the unregulated market at work? 
While human rights and the rule of law were discussed and 
planned for in other parts of Bosnia,38 they were blatantly violated in 
Arizona Market with the full acquiescence of the IC, which insisted 
that the market represented the highest expression of free market 
ideals.  Eventually it was publicly acknowledged that women and girls 
were being trafficked through Arizona Market.  Later still, it was rec-
ognized, if not formally acknowledged by the IC at large, that some of 
the perpetrators purchasing and even selling women at Arizona Mar-
ket were themselves members of the IC.39  The presence of the IC in 
Bosnia, their endorsement of the market, and their activities within 
the market had contributed significantly to the problem by creating 
the demand for black market dealings and human trafficking within 
the region. 
35 See Boyd, supra note 17, at 52-53 (supporting the view that Arizona Market showed 
how market forces and market needs would slowly allow people to set aside hostility in 
favor of making money); see also Kanin, supra note 28, at 513 (arguing that Arizona Mar-
ket is “the prototype of both the problem [of corruption and criminal economic activity] 
and its solution” but also noting that “‘rule of law’ . . . more likely would emerge from 
spontaneous, informal economic activity than from externally imposed administration”).  
But see Timothy William Waters, Assuming Bosnia:  Taking Polities Seriously in Ethnically Di-
vided States (controverting the view of Bosnia as a paradigm of justice, and providing ar-
guments for an open dialogue about future ethnic divisions in the country), in DECON-
STRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 53, 69-78.  
36 See John McGhie, Women for Sale, RED PEPPER (U.K.), Aug. 2000, at 16, 17 
(“Apart from one or two anti-traffickers there is little sense that this is a major issue.  
And if the U.N. chiefs know what is going on, there is hardly a feeling of urgency in 
combating it.”).   
37 No evidence has surfaced that men or boys were trafficked through Arizona Market. 
38 Many international actors were involved in this planning:  the OHR (acting as 
international administrative agency); the OSCE; and multiple U.N. agencies, including 
the UNHCR, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the 
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), and the Office for the Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
39 See Sherwell, supra note 30; discussion infra note 64. 
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C.  Politico- and Socioeconomic Engineering:  The Story of  
Brcko and Its Relationship to Arizona Market 
The story of Arizona Market cannot be told without an under-
standing of the unique town of Brcko.  The Dayton Peace Accords 
brought to the table indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic from 
Serbia (who died before the conclusion of his trial), Franjo Tudjman 
from Croatia (who might well have been indicted had he lived), and 
Alija Izetbegovic from Bosnia (often criticized, but never indicted) to 
negotiate cessation of hostilities.40  The final sticking point at Dayton, 
which threatened to undo all of the preceding negotiations, was what 
should be done with the town of Brcko.41 
Strategically located along both the Zagreb-Belgrade highway and 
the Sava River, in the northeast of Bosnia, the town of Brcko joins Bos-
nia to the rest of the former Yugoslavia and Europe.  It is an extremely 
important geographic location from any economic standpoint but was 
especially important to the Bosnian Serbs.42  Despite being a majority 
Bosniak (and Muslim) town before the war, Brcko was the geographic 
link connecting the eastern and western parts of the Republika Srpska.  
Without control over Brcko, the Serb Republic would be divided in two 
parts, which would amount to any military strategist’s nightmare.43 
In order to gain control over this territory during the war, the 
Bosnian Serbs, led by “Arkan,”44 decimated the town.  Bosnian Serbs 
forcibly expelled Bosniaks and Croats, and many were tortured, raped, 
40 There were other men at the table—international diplomats—but of course no 
women, a situation that has been described as a failure to “reimagine gender relations 
and to provide a contemporary model of citizenship and democracy for women.”  
Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality:  Democracy and Citizenship of Wom-
en in the Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 103, 112 (2001); see also Rees, supra 
note 12, at 54-55 (reporting that the individuals who negotiated the Dayton Accords 
“were almost all men”); Cynthia Cockburn, The Postwar Moment:  Lessons from Bosnia 
Herzegovina, WOMEN & ENV’TS INT’L MAG., Spring 2003, at 6, 6-7 (explaining the lack 
of female representation).  This gender disparity was lost on the negotiators and par-
ties but not on the women’s NGO Kvinna till Kvinna, which sent a letter to Madeleine 
Albright on the day of the signing of the Accords without result.  Rees, supra note 12, 
at 55; see also infra Parts III-IV. 
41 Muhamed Sacirbey, Brcko Poker, EUR. COURIER, Mar. 17, 2009, http:// 
www.europeancourier.org/171.htm. 
42 See Fontenot, supra note 15, at 201 (“The city was the center of gravity both in 
military and economic terms; it was the place at which success had to be obtained.”). 
43 See id.; see also Sacirbey, supra note 41. 
44 Arkan, whose real name was Zeljko Raznatovic, was indicted for war crimes after 
the war but never tried because he was gunned down in the lobby of Belgrade’s Inter-
continental Hotel in January 2000.  Steven Erlanger, Suspect in Serbian War Crimes Mur-
dered by Masked Gunmen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at 1. 
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and killed.45  There were said to be twenty camps around the town of 
Brcko during the war, in which many of those who had been forcibly 
expelled were subsequently held captive.46 
As a consequence of the war and expulsions, the town split into 
three submunicipalities after the war:  Ravne-Brcko (the Croat section, 
which would initially host Arizona Market), Brcko Grad (housing the 
Serb population in the town center), and Brcko-Rahic (the Bosniak 
section).47  During the war, as Bosnian Serbs were displaced from Sara-
jevo, other parts of Bosnia, and Croatia,48 they were provided with 
housing (both homes and socially owned apartments) that had for-
merly belonged to the expelled or imprisoned Bosniaks and Croats.  
This sort of ethnic displacement was taking place all over Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Serbia and affected all ethnic groups.  As each ethnic 
minority group was forced out or fled, a newly arrived ethnic group 
would be given their “abandoned” homes, creating new ethnic majori-
ties.49  In Brcko, the wartime ethnic violence50 and displacement 
created a strategic Serb majority.51 
45 See id.; Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 205 (“The importance of Brcko . . . translated to 
a series of atrocities against the Bosniak and Croat inhabitants of the town . . . .”). 
46 See Peter Popham, Winning the Peace in the Balkans:  Risen from the Ashes of War, 
INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 18, 2005, at 30, available at LEXIS (discussing how over 
30,000 Bosniaks and Croats were driven to prison camps outside Brcko).  The most 
notorious of these camps was the luka (port) camp, where such brutal crimes and mas-
sacres took place that camp leaders Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cešic were indicted for 
crimes against humanity.  See Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 206 (situating these massacres 
within a larger attempt by Serbian forces to destroy all symbols of cultural heterogenei-
ty and replace them with Serbian historical and cultural markers). 
47 See Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 215. 
48 Between 150,000 and 200,000 Krajina Serbs were expelled from Croatia over a 
thirty-six-hour period during “Operation Storm” in August 1995, when the Croatian 
army, trained by a U.S. military firm in an arrangement approved by the U.S. govern-
ment, forcibly expelled ethnic Serbs and killed many.  See Impunity for War Crimes Must 
End, GLOBAL POL’Y F., Mar. 16, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/ 
content/article/168/29343.html (linking the EU’s delay of accession negotiations with 
Croatia to murders and other crimes committed during Operation Storm); Srdja Trif-
kovic, The Really Bad Dogs of War, CHRONICLES, Oct. 11, 2007, available at 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7052 (identifying MPRI as 
the American firm that trained Croat forces in preparation for Operation Storm); Ne-
ven Crvenkovic, Home Again:  10 Years After Croatia’s Operation Storm (Aug. 5, 
2005), http://www.unhcr.org/42f38b084.html (noting the large influx of Serbs into 
Yugoslavia and the expulsion of non-Serbs in 1991 preceding Operation Storm’s ex-
pulsion of Serbs). 
49 See infra Section IV.D (discussing further the laws used to implement this prop-
erty-based ethnic cleansing).  In Croatia, this was further complicated by then-
President Franjo Tudjman’s invitation to Bosnian Croats to move to Croatia and take 
up residence in homes and flats “abandoned” by Krajina Serbs.  Id.  These displace-
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At the very end of the Dayton peace negotiations, when all else 
had been agreed upon save the fate of Brcko, Milosevic told negotia-
tor Richard Holbrooke that he would “walk the final mile for peace”52 
by giving up on the stalemate, which in any case would have benefit-
ted Bosnian Serbs rather than his country, Serbia.  Milosevic suggested 
submitting the Brcko issue to arbitration.53  Holbrooke accepted this 
solution, and an American along with entity representatives from Bos-
nia were appointed to arbitrate the issue of Brcko.  Brcko was then 
filled with American troops, and a U.S. Department of State diplomat 
was appointed to “supervise” the town.54  Eventually, in 1999, Brcko 
was made an autonomous district and a full protectorate under the 
authority of an American international administrator, who appointed 
(contrary to the democratic principles of electing local officials) all 
local authorities until 2004.55 
The rehabilitation of the town was fully engineered by the IC, 
which was heavily influenced by the Americans.  Despite this outside 
influence, or more probably because of it, Brcko has been praised ul-
timately as a success story, even by such notoriously critical watchdogs 
as the International Crisis Group.56  Still, when understanding how 
ment and housing issues cannot be understood without also looking at Croatia, Serbia, 
and even Kosovo.  Id. 
50 This was arguably only nationalist violence because most Bosnian Croats, Bos-
nian Serbs, and Bosniaks share a common ethnic Slavic origin. 
51 Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 205-06. 
52 Popham, supra note 46, at 30-31 (quoting Slobodan Milosevic). 
53 See id. (suggesting that “Dayton succeeded because Brcko . . . was set aside to be 
decided later”). 
54 See Haynes, supra note 4, at 13 & n.17 (arguing that the international political 
arrangement in Brcko emulated somewhat General MacArthur’s governance in Japan 
after World War II); Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 209. 
55 Even the word for the new protectorate, distrikt, was based on the American go-
vernance and electoral concept of “districts,” while the rest of Bosnia was organized in 
opstinas.  This linguistic anomaly is further evidence of the total U.S. control of Brcko 
and its postwar administration.   
56 See Mark Landler, Strong Hand and a Little Cash Can Help Revive Ethnic Peace:  Na-
tion-Building/Success Story in Bosnia, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 20, 2003, at 2, available at 
LEXIS (quoting Mark Wheeler, director of the Bosnia Project at the International Cri-
sis Group, as stating that Brcko was “the worst place you could imagine in Bos-
nia . . . . But the international community equipped people with enough authority to 
get their jobs done.”); see also Bieber, supra note 31, at 431 (“Brcko has been and prob-
ably will be a model for institutional design in other regions . . . .”); Jeffrey, supra note 
27, at 204 (“The experience of Brcko encourages reflection on the ways through which 
international and local state organisations have worked together to create sustainable 
practices of multi-ethnic government in post-conflict Bosnia.”).  But see INT’L CRISIS 
GROUP, BRCKO:  WHAT BOSNIA COULD BE 1 (1998) (explaining that, at the time of the 
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economic and political engineering in Brcko helped create Arizona 
Market, it is important to note that the terms of arbitration that 
created Brcko also yielded a tax and customs structure independent 
from Bosnia’s.  This imbued the town with instantly attractive neoli-
beral economic advantages and infinitely better economic possibilities 
than the rest of Bosnia.57  A considerable amount of the tax base for 
Brcko eventually came from Arizona Market, and still does. 
Because the United States had such influence over the reconstruc-
tion of the Brcko District,58 it is not a stretch to imagine how the idea 
of something like Arizona Market arose.  Situated right outside of 
Brcko and ostensibly stimulating the multiethnic harmony for which 
the IC strived and for which the United States negotiated at the Day-
ton Peace Accords, the creation of the market was only natural. 
If Arizona Market was an experiment in capitalism, then Brcko 
was an experiment in democratization.  The early narrative surround-
ing Brcko’s “governance by fiat” model was often harshly critical of 
the model for purporting to create a democracy, even while relying 
upon autocracy.59  By contrast, Arizona Market tended to be praised as 
a freewheeling, free market, harmonizing force.60  And the positive 
“free market fosters ethnic harmony” narrative persisted, even once 
the market’s seedy underbelly was exposed.61 
report’s publication, the International Supervisor had only seen “mixed” results in his 
plans to revitalize Brcko). 
57 See EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA 
17-18 (2004) (noting that although, like the rest of Bosnia, Brcko was under interna-
tional supervision, Brcko “had by far the highest level of public salaries in the whole 
country”).  Brcko differed from the rest of Bosnia in many respects, but in being sub-
ject to international supervision, it was similar.  The rest of Bosnia was being “super-
vised” by the High Representative, who represented the member states that comprised 
the Peace Implementation Council, a group of interested states primarily affiliated 
with NATO.  Unlike other peace operations, the U.N. played a lesser role and the pri-
mary role of reconstruction was given to the OHR.  Brcko was also being reconstructed 
by the Supervisor, appointed through the Dayton-initiated arbitration. 
58 For example, in addition to the fact that Brcko’s supervisors were American diplo-
mats, the organization created to run Brcko’s institutions was the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID)–funded “District Management Team,” which was assisted by 
U.S. consulting firms.  See Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 215-16 (highlighting the Supervisor’s es-
sentially unchallenged power in designating the instruments of democratization). 
59 See DAVID CHANDLER, BOSNIA:  FAKING DEMOCRACY AFTER DAYTON 1-3 (1999) 
(“Three years of intensive involvement by the world’s most powerful states . . . has 
done little to create viable institutions of self-government in the state.”). 
60 See, e.g., ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 132-33 (calling Arizona Market “the most impres-
sive evidence” of “the ability to overcome ethnic divides” within a “clandestine economy”). 
61 Political scientists have made interesting arguments about why the dark, in-
scrutable, and private nature of the market would suit the locals adequately, even aside 
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The democracy of Brcko was a strange sort of democracy, a sort of 
autocratic democracy wherein the International Supervisor appointed 
all local officials.  Even Bosnia’s high school history books ended with 
World War II, as no one was prepared to take on the task of develop-
ing a text describing the more recent regional war that might be satis-
factory to all three ethnicities.62  Similarly, the capitalism of Arizona 
Market was a strange sort of capitalism in which recently warring 
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks joined together in nefarious business ven-
tures, including the sale of human beings for profit. 
D.  Human Trafficking at Arizona Market 
There are no nice human trafficking stories, but at Arizona Mar-
ket, human trafficking was particularly grim and came closest to 
matching the now-pervasive moniker “modern day slavery.”  At Arizo-
na Market, women, and often girls, were “order[ed] to take off all 
their clothes and . . . stand[] [in] the road naked . . . like cattle.”63 
The presence of 50,000 or more international men in Bosnia as 
part of the peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts, usually without 
their female partners, created a demand for women who could be 
hired for sex.64  The black marketeers, who had already become 
from a desire to prevent their illegal black market and private-sphere activity from 
coming to light.  See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE:  HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO 
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 53-54 (1998) (explaining that develop-
ing an inscrutable infrastructure protects the governing elites against invasion by new-
comers who do not understand how to get around, literally or figuratively, and thus fail 
both to see what is truly happening right under their noses and to take control of and 
change it to suit their tastes). 
62 See Landler, supra note 56 (quoting a Brcko high-school student who said, “[W]e 
don’t know anything about the war . . . . Our history class ends with World War II.”). 
63 Michael Voss, ‘Slave Trade’ Thrives in Bosnia:  High Unemployment Makes 
Women Easy Prey (Mar. 8, 2001), http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/ukraine/ 
slavebosnia.htm (quoting Mara Radovanovic).  This has led some to refer to Arizona 
Market, without irony, as a “women market.”  Id.; see also Michael Harris, Horror Under 
the Covers, OTTAWA SUN, Oct. 24, 2003, at 15 (reviewing VICTOR MALAREK, THE NATA-
SHAS:  INSIDE THE NEW GLOBAL SEX TRADE (2003)); McGhie, supra note 36, at 16-17 
(calling Arizona Market “the biggest slave market in Europe,” and stating that 
“[i]nternational police based in Brcko said women are often put on stage in a back-
room bar, pirouetting in different costumes while buyers inspect their flesh and look 
into the women’s mouths before making a bid.  The more attractive ones fetch 
DM2,000-DM4,000 (£650-£1,300).”). 
64 See McGhie, supra note 36, at 17 (quoting Madeleine Rees, then head of the 
UNHCHR in Bosnia, as saying, “‘If you look at the patterns of trafficking world-wide, 
essentially you only get it where you’re going to have a market,’ says Rees.  ‘It’s a de-
mand-led thing, and basically in 1993 we had the presence of Unprofor (UN Protec-
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skilled at operating across borders and outside of the law, quickly sa-
tisfied that demand with a supply of women and girls who had few 
other economic prospects.65  The traffickers lured these women out of 
their communities almost always under false pretenses.  The traffick-
ers usually told the women that they would be taken into Western Eu-
rope to work as hostesses, nannies, or hotel staff.66 
Instead, the women were bought and sold like chattels.  Once put 
to work in brothels, the women were trapped in debt peonage, under 
which they were forced to pay off the “debt” of their own purchase 
and transport.67  The women, who came primarily from Moldova, 
Ukraine, and Romania, were available in large part due to the collaps-
ing socialist economies in their home countries.68  This economic 
turmoil was arguably exacerbated by the neoliberal economic policies 
that the IC imposed on these collapsing economies.  According to the 
UNDP, more than 10,000 women and girls (and possibly some men 
and boys) were trafficked through Arizona Market in the year 2000 
alone.  Traffickers used Arizona Market as a hub for women trafficked 
into the rest of the Former Yugoslavia and on to Western Europe, 
Israel, and Turkey.69  The elements of organized crime that coordi-
nated the trafficking were extremely dangerous.70  Traffickers fre-
tion Force—the military predecessor of the Stabilisation Force, Sfor), and undoubtedly 
that was one of the pull factors.’”). 
65 See also infra Part IV (arguing that the IC also played a role in creating the 
supply of women through creation of regional economic policies that increased un-
employment and particularly the unemployment of women). 
66 See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 30, at 222 (relating the story of a Moldovan girl 
whose brother-in-law promised to find her a job as a hostess in Italy but then sold her 
into slavery in Bosnia); Rees, supra note 12, at 57. 
67 See David Binder, In a Postwar Zone, the Sex Trade Flourishes, MSNBC.COM, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/?id=3071976 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“[Women are] 
bought and sold constantly.  At the ‘Arizona Market’ . . . they sell women like animals.  
They have to pay off the cost of their own sale.  [The women] earn from $50 an hour 
to $500 a night [for the brothel owners], but are paid between $100 and as little as $13 
a month.” (quoting Nidia Casati of the International Organization for Migration)). 
68 See, e.g., Denise Horn, Bringing Moldova’s Women into the Democratization Process, 
RADIOFREEEUROPE/RADIOLIBERTY, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/ 
Bringing_Moldovas_Women_Into_The_Democratization_Process/1927570.html (dis-
cussing trafficking during the economic transition in Moldova). 
69 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE PROTECTION ACT 
2000:  TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 31 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/10815.pdf; see also Grave problème de traite des femmes en Bosnie 
selon l’ONU, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 19, 2000, available at WL.  
70 See NATO Parliamentary Assembly, supra note 14, at 2 (“[T]he conflict in the 
Balkans facilitated heroin transit to Europe through that region . . . [such] that the 
flood of refugees and migrants from the combat areas towards the EU [saw] the emer-
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quently beat their victims, and as of 1999, authorities had found ten 
women murdered, ostensibly by their traffickers.  One of these mur-
der victims was discovered with her mouth taped shut with tape bear-
ing the symbol and name of the OSCE, a bold statement that the traf-
fickers felt free to operate as brutally as necessary.  This was not only 
in spite of the international presence but largely because the interna-
tional security and development personnel economically supported 
and drove the illicit market in women.71 
By 1999, it was well-known that peacekeepers and other interna-
tionals were spending time in Arizona Market—purchasing sex, buying 
women, and sometimes even selling them.72  Nevertheless, when High 
gence of the formidable Albanian mafias, whose role in several cases involving narcot-
ics, illegal immigration and prostitution has been demonstrated.”). 
71 McGhie argues that the tape on the murder victims’ mouths was also a message 
to women that 
organised crime . . . will not tolerate women speaking out.   
 The problems in fighting trafficking are legion.  Corruption is endemic; 
there is a prevailing culture where it is all right to visit brothels and most local 
police are unwilling to tackle the ‘low priority’ problem. 
McGhie, supra note 36, at 17. 
72 With the arrival of internationals creating demand for women who could be 
hired for sex, brothels sprang up all over the region, not just in Arizona Market.  It was 
estimated that thirty percent of the clients and eighty percent of the traffickers’ reve-
nue came from the IC.  Rees, supra note 12, at 63.  Although some members of the IC 
were instrumental in successfully liberating trafficked women, “there [were] numerous 
allegations that members of the international police force were involved in the traffick-
ing.”  UN Police Officers Resign After Raid, U.N. WIRE, Nov. 30, 2000, http:// 
www.unwire.org/unwire/20001130/11995_story.asp.  For example, an American U.N. 
officer was dismissed after buying a Moldovan woman for $2900.  Colum Lynch, Mis-
conduct, Corruption by U.S. Police Mar Bosnia Mission, WASH. POST, May 29, 2001, at A1.  
Military subcontractors were also involved in illegal activity.  By 1998, eight employees 
of a large subcontracting firm, Dyncorp, had been relieved of their duties in Bosnia 
after allegations of their participation in sex trafficking arose.  Antony Barnett & So-
lomon Hughes, British Firm Accused in UN ‘Sex Scandal,’ OBSERVER (London), July 29, 
2001, at 4; see also Haynes, supra note 30, at 236-37 (discussing the complicity of peace-
keepers and international workers in prostitution and trafficking).  NATO soldiers and 
Italian, Portuguese, and Egyptian SFOR troops were accused of forcing twelve- to four-
teen-year-old girls to have sex with them, although NATO dismissed the allegations 
after it conducted its own internal investigation.  Nancy L. Torner, No Evidence of Crimes 
by SFOR Troops, UPI, Aug. 25, 1998, available at LEXIS.  But see McGhie, supra note 36, 
at 17 (listing evidence supporting the claim that U.N. and NGO personnel used traf-
ficked women for sex).  McGhie catalogues the evidence in this way: 
 [A] UN report, unpublished outside Bosnia, [spoke] of “compelling 
evidence of complicity” of local and international police and Sfor in 
14 cases [as of 1999];  
 four other cases [as of 1999], one involving Sfor and three the Inter-
national Police Task Force (IPTF), where men had trafficked women;  
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Representative Wolfgang Petrisch belatedly tried to shut down Arizona 
Market, calling it a “lawless wasteland,” an American colonel argued to 
keep it open, pointing out by way of comparison that Times Square in 
New York City was far from perfect with its own host of pimps and pros-
titutes.73  Such statements suggest that a “boys will be boys” mentality 
was accepted by some as a justification for the improper behavior of 
military and international personnel participating in postconflict recon-
struction work.  The reasoning was that military personnel who were in-
volved in risky and demanding work so far from home ought at least to 
be allowed the comfort of sex.74  This acceptance of prostitute use 
among internationals was bolstered by the misconception that the 
women had freely chosen their “profession” and wanted to be involved 
in the illegal activities taking place at Arizona Market.75 
However, even once it became apparent that the prostitutes were 
actually trafficked women and that the brothels held women against 
their will, no crackdown was immediately forthcoming.  The myth of 
the free market insulated Arizona Market from being seen for what it 
was—a place where the worst kind of human behaviors were perpe-
trated against women and girls, with the complicity and involvement 
of the very internationals tasked with bringing about peace and securi-
ty.  The belief that anything that normalized Bosnia was helpful and 
that trade is as normal as it gets justified the activities that took place 
in the market.  This belief trumped proof that criminal, abusive, coer-
 in one small IPTF base two officers admitted to us they regularly vi-
sited brothels where they knew trafficked women were held;  
 five IPTF officers were recently sent home for being caught in raids 
on brothels;  
 a number of staff (unconfirmed reports say six) from the Office of 
High Representative—the most senior UN body in Bosnia—were al-
so recently caught in a brothel raid; 
 we saw, and filmed, European Union vehicles parked outside a well 
known Sarajevo brothel, and saw UN vehicles outside other brothels; 
 we secretly filmed a senior US member of the international com-
munity in a brothel boasting about how easy it was to buy a woman 
“as property.” 
Id. 
73 Bruce R. Scott & Edward N. Murphy, Brcko and the Arizona Market, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Aug. 4, 2006, at 1, 17.   
74 For more discussion of this attitude, see generally NAOMI CAHN, DINA FRANCES-
CA HAYNES & FIONNUALA NI AOLAIN, ON THE FRONTLINES:  GENDER AND POST CON-
FLICT RECONSTRUCTION (forthcoming 2010). 
75 See McGhie, supra note 36, at 17 (observing the sentiment of many internation-
als in Bosnia that the trafficked women “look happy enough and if they get their mon-
ey, what’s the fuss about?”). 
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cive, and exploitative activity—not “normal” trade—was taking place 
in Arizona Market. 
Many gender scholars from the Former Yugoslavia, aware of the 
gravity of human trafficking in Bosnia, frame the problem as a horrific 
derivative of development and neoliberalism: 
There are many sovereign exceptions a variety of state agents can and do 
grant themselves/ourselves routinely, with horrible consequences for lo-
cal development and for humanitarian/human outcomes.  There are al-
so brutal local transitions that defy any sense that the world is moving in 
generally democratic directions.  It is important to . . . see and address 
more of the troubling biopolitics of our times.
76
 
Human trafficking in and through Bosnia was a derivative of devel-
opment in that the massive influx of predominantly male military per-
sonnel, peacekeepers, humanitarian officers, and supply teams 
charged with reconstructing Bosnia after the war created the market 
for trafficked women and girls.  Arizona Market is likewise derivative 
of neoliberalism because those very same military personnel, peace-
keepers, and humanitarian officers trusted the market to create a 
place of social justice and to correct for any abuses.77  Thus, the forces 
that created Arizona Market and allowed it to thrive were also the 
consumers of its abusively obtained human “goods.” 
In December 2001, Arizona Market was privatized, falling in line 
with the rest of the Bosnian capitalist progress plan.  The winning bid 
for the market came from an Italian-Bosnian company called ItalPro-
jekt.78  Despite the move to privatize, however, the market remained 
rife with lawlessness, attracting bad actors and bad activities that some-
times spilled over to areas surrounding the market.79  The organized-
76 Christine Sylvester, Bare Life as a Development/Postcolonial Problematic, 172 GEO-
GRAPHICAL J. 66, 75-76 (2006). 
77 See infra Section III.B (discussing neoliberalism and some of its definitions, as 
well as some aspects of development theory). 
78 See Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 215-16 (“ItalProjekt reopened [Arizona Market] in 2004 
as [sic] out-of-town mall and tourist attraction.”); see also Peter Moertenboeck & Helge Moo-
shammer, Trading Places, NETWORKED CULTURES, http://www.networkedcultures.org/ 
index.php?tdid=85 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“[Arizona Market is now said to host] 2,500 
stalls and shops sprawling over 25 hectares of land, 3 million visitors per year and some 
20,000 people employed by the market.”). 
79 In October 2001, I was driving back to Belgrade from Sarajevo with another in-
ternational in his organization’s vehicle, which was white with diplomatic plates.  As we 
neared Arizona Market at night, a body went flying up into the air, landing in the road 
in front of our car.  The car in front of us, which had hit this person, pulled over mo-
mentarily and then sped away.  We stopped and I held the man as he died barefoot, 
having literally been thrown out of his shoes, which my colleague found further up the 
road.  Although the area was populated with bars, brothels, and cafés, only a few 
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crime bosses running the market were not happy with its purchase by 
ItalProjekt, as they lost a substantial amount of money via increased 
taxes to the municipality of Brcko-Ravne.80  The stall owners contin-
ued to pay the same amount they had always paid to operate their 
stalls, but the money was no longer being directed to the shadow 
bosses; it was now a formal tax.81  Despite any loss of profits from the 
reorganization and privatization, as of 2003, the market was still re-
ferred to as “a sprawling, seedy collection of hawkers who have set up 
stalls on the edge of town.”82  By 2008, although “commercialized” and 
privately operated, Arizona Market was still thriving as a hub for crim-
inal activity, black marketeering, and money laundering.83 
II.  MAJOR FLAWS IN POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
The postconflict reconstruction process is as much to blame for the 
creation of a place like Arizona Market as much as are the particular 
people present at the cessation of hostilities.  Critiques of postconflict 
reconstruction include that it is too reactive and not thoughtful or ref-
lective enough; that the entire process lacks clear doctrine; that the 
players on the ground tend to make decisions far beyond their skill le-
vels or outside their areas of expertise; and that the entire process risks 
being driven by the interests of available donors and financiers rather 
than by any coherent developing doctrine, local needs assessments, or 
lessons learned in prior postconflict reconstruction scenarios. 
people came to the scene of the accident to see what had happened.  Cars approach-
ing behind us slowed down but then pulled around us and continued on.  Eventually, 
one man approached on foot but before coming too near us said in an urgent tone, 
“Get out of here!  Someone will come and blame you.”  We replied that we had not hit 
the victim and that the man was a witness to that fact.  Nonetheless, the man respond-
ed, “But there is no way we will talk to police about this,” and he left.  We eventually 
drove on and reported the incident at the nearest police station.  The police shrugged 
and said that there were always drunks and people wandering around Arizona Market 
looking for trouble, as if this death were inconsequential.  
80 See Landler, supra note 56 (explaining that the developers planned on trans-
forming Arizona Market from a “Third World bazaar into a first-world shopping cen-
ter”); see also Sherwell, supra note 30 (quoting an OHR spokesperson as saying that the 
OHR had “created a monster” in depriving Brcko of its tax revenue by allowing the 
black market economy to persist). 
81 Landler, supra note 56; Sherwell, supra note 30. 
82 Landler, supra note 56. 
83 See, e.g., Željko Rogošic, Hunt for the Pale Gang:  Search for the Split Robbers, NA-
CIONAL (Zagreb, Croat.), May 12, 2008, available at http://www.nacional.hr/ 
en/clanak/45428/search-for-the-split-robbers (explaining that after robbing the Croa-
tian postal service in Split, one of the thieves involved was arrested trying to exchange 
350,000 kuna at the Arizona Market). 
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A.  Lack of Postconflict Doctrine Addressing Women 
In postconflict reconstruction, there are no playbooks save the 
agreements that may have been drafted during peace negotiations.  In 
Bosnia, the Dayton Framework served as a sort of legal working doc-
ument for aiding organizations and signatories in moving from the 
cessation of hostilities to sustainable peace and security.  Because the 
guiding documents, like the Dayton Framework, are often broad and 
vague, the people assigned to carry out the practical tasks of recon-
struction have tremendous power to shape the entire dynamic of the 
country being reconstructed.84 
Since there are no set rules for handling postconflict reconstruc-
tion,85 those leading reconstruction efforts must navigate anew, usually 
with little consideration of what has come before.  There is some wis-
dom in this approach, since peace negotiations and postconflict recon-
struction plans must be country specific, taking into account the coun-
try’s culture, history, and past conflict.  Despite the flexibility afforded 
by approaching such situations with a blank slate, there is one reason to 
be highly critical of this method:  the air of extreme urgency that inevit-
ably surrounds such uncharted negotiations.  The lack of a clear path to 
follow creates a sense that the peace terms need to be locked in imme-
diately and urgently, while the details can be revised later.  As the Day-
ton Framework demonstrates, however, far more than the simple peace 
terms are at stake in this process.  In Dayton, the entire plan for the 
long-term reconstruction of Bosnia, including the plan to create a mar-
ket economy, was set in motion.  In the rush to create a plan, the nego-
tiators failed to consider gender issues and did not address the particu-
lar needs of women in the aftermath of the conflict. 
Gender “mainstreaming,”86 a concept which began making its way 
into development parlance and official U.N. resolutions at the turn of 
the century, has failed to become a meaningful part of postconflict re-
construction plans.  Too often, individualized conflict negotiations, 
filled with a sense of urgency, leave gender mainstreaming in the lurch 
and focus instead only on what is needed to secure peace in the imme-
diate short term.  After the horrific gender-based crimes carried out in 
Bosnia during and after the war, this approach is simply unacceptable.  
84 See Haynes, supra note 4, at 25-27 (arguing that the IC has too much power and 
not enough expertise or guidance in carrying out effective postconflict reconstruction).  
85 Documents such as U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 arguably constitute 
an exception.  See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.  
86 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1325, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) (acknowledging 
“the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations”). 
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Surely, the security of equity and rights for women deserves at least 
equal consideration with the creation of a market economy, a project 
considered by negotiators to be crucial for immediate peace in Bosnia.87 
The term “gender mainstreaming” is now used quite commonly 
among U.N. agencies and in democratization efforts, particularly 
with regard to the development of so-called “hard” civil and political 
rights.88  A concentration on civil and political rights means that, at 
best, women will be inserted into public office—by quota if neces-
sary—or included in electoral and party lists.  In some instances, fa-
cilitators of gender mainstreaming recognize that in order for wom-
en to access their political and civil rights, they may have to be 
educated on the voting process, and alternative voting processes may 
need to be provided where women are largely illiterate.89  In general, 
however, gender mainstreaming fails to be included broadly or regu-
larly in peacemaking and peacebuilding plans.90  Even though gend-
er equity is now officially required by international organizations, it 
will continue to be ignored until it is included in a formula for post-
conflict reconstruction. 
87 This is evidenced by the fact that the drafters of the Dayton Framework Agree-
ment for Peace included these provisions within the document.  See infra note 126 and 
Section III.B (discussing the Framework provisions with regard to market liberaliza-
tion); see also CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74 (arguing that inclusion of 
gender considerations is crucial to longer-term postconflict stability). 
88 “Hard” rights are civil and political rights that are both enforceable by law and 
emphasized in practice.  By contrast, “soft” rights are economic, cultural, and social 
rights that are neither emphasized nor enforced by law—particularly in transitional 
states.  See, e.g., Savitri Goonesekere, A Rights-Based Approach to Realizing Gender 
Equity, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/news/savitri.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010) (“It is sometimes argued that there is a hierarchy of rights according to which 
some rights (civil and political) are more important than others, guaranteed and im-
mediately realizable.  According to the same argument, other rights (socio-economic 
and cultural rights) are not immediately realizable . . . .”). 
89 See S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 86, para. 8(c) (calling on actors to adopt 
“[m]easures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and 
girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and 
the judiciary”).  In 2003, the Secretary-General also highlighted the important role of 
national election commissions in promoting women’s political participation in post-
conflict countries, including “the need to ensure that peace agreements contain provi-
sions for the conduct of elections” and the establishment of “an independent and neu-
tral national electoral commission that includes an equal number of women and men 
and whose membership and mandate is the result of consultations with civil society 
groups, including women’s organizations.”  See The Secretary-General, Report of the Sec-
retary-General on Women’s Equal Participation in Conflict Prevention, Management and Con-
flict Resolution and in Post-Conflict Peace-Building, para. 42, delivered to the Commission on the 
Status of Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2004/10 (Dec. 22, 2003). 
90 See CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74. 
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B.  Postconflict Reconstruction Is Too Reactive 
In the aftermath of war, the individuals who define the programs 
and initiatives of the reconstruction tend to be the same individuals 
who were originally tasked with keeping the peace and securing the 
cessation of hostilities.  As a result, too many of these early postconflict 
programs and initiatives risk being devised by military personnel and 
diplomats accustomed to operating in emergency mode.  A primary 
tenet of military service is obeying command directives and mandates 
to secure the peace.  Military personnel are simply trained to achieve 
very different objectives than reconstruction requires.  Reconstruction 
focuses on securing sustainable rights and equality and requires a dif-
ferent set of professional skills for successful implementation.  It is al-
so of note that the vast majority of people on the ground and at the 
organizational headquarters of the various international institutions 
responsible for securing the peace are male. 
Few of the people on the ground at the end of a war are the right 
people to be making decisions about long-term political and econom-
ic reform.91  However, because military actors are almost inevitably on 
the scene at the end of the war, they often become involved in deci-
sionmaking processes to resolve postconflict issues, even those that fall 
far outside of the scope and capacity of military expertise.  For exam-
ple, one such military actor in Bosnia noted that 
[w]e understood that, by necessity, the brigade would become involved 
in setting the conditions necessary for achievement of the civil aspects of 
the treaty as well as those military.  The leadership did not view this as 
mission creep but understood that civil-military cooperation was an es-
sential, implied task of the mission.
92
 
They act as if recognizing a need, whether it be for economic or rule-of-
law reform, automatically implies their suitability to respond to it.93  
These military personnel also tend to take one idea, like winning the 
locals over by offering protection at Arizona Market, as carte blanche 
91 One retired U.S. Army Colonel expressed the view that it was “essential for our 
military force to assume critical civil tasks” in Bosnia because “the civil support ele-
ments were slow to deploy.”  Fontenot, supra note 15, at 199. 
92 Id.    
93 See id. (“Successful execution of the military tasks set the conditions for peace by 
removing the immediate threat of actual combat, but only by achieving routine com-
pliance, restoring the economy, and starting down the road to reconciliation could 
lasting peace be achieved.”). 
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to go forward with other recommendations about that activity, such as 
championing the market as a way to eradicate ethnic hostility.94 
Many of those who engage in postconflict work arrive in the field 
well before the cessation of hostilities.  Many more arrive shortly after 
the formal cessation of hostilities.  In this environment, when the 
theater is not yet secure,95 those preparing short- and long-term post-
conflict strategies and programs tend to operate as if they are in 
emergency response mode.  As time passes, however, operating in 
emergency mode becomes self-perpetuating, as if internationals are 
identifying conflict in order to respond to it.96 
Responding in a reactive manner appropriate to an emergency has 
negative consequences for many aspects of postconflict reconstruction 
and is particularly detrimental for women.  First, male military and pro-
tective figures tend, in this emergency mindset, to see women as hapless 
victims who need to be rescued, or occasionally, as was the case in Bos-
nia, to be further victimized.  Second, when the internationals believe 
they are dealing with emergencies, requiring urgent emergency res-
ponses, they are not usually inclined to consider “mere” women’s issues 
to be immediate priorities.97  One of the consequences of working in 
the postconflict theater, employing military jargon on a daily basis and 
reflexively reacting rather than planning, is that the IC may remain in 
emergency mode for years after the conflict.  Even when things settle—
when there is less reason to treat everything as an emergency and every 
incentive to be thoughtful in creating long-term strategies, programs, 
and plans—the IC continues to operate in reactive mode.98  The post-
conflict personnel on the ground are often not best suited for manag-
94 See, e.g., id. 
95 For example, well into 1999, the main road between Banja Luka (capital of the 
Serb entity) and Sarajevo (capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina) crossed the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line, which marked a line of confrontation.  It was unrepaired, mined in 
many places, and those of us who used the road assumed a certain amount of risk in 
doing so.  People with license plates from one entity did not travel to the other for fear 
of physical harm.  Land mines were common, and war criminals indicted by the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were still at large.  All of these factors lent 
a certain amount of tension to the postconflict work, which resulted in living and work-
ing on edge.  A certain amount of that defensive behavior inevitably affected the prep-
aration of our programs in the area. 
96 See also Haynes, supra note 4, at 22 (arguing that agencies in postconflict situa-
tions continually expand their mandates in order to ensure that sufficient work con-
tinues to exist for them in the developing nation). 
97 See Rees, supra note 12, at 58 (“[T]he circumstances did not appear to offer the 
latitude to think about ‘mere’ sex equality . . . .”). 
98 See Haynes, supra note 4, at 26-27. 
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ing economic or social policy, nor for making long-term decisions 
about sustainable rule-of-law or human rights institutions.  This normal-
ly does not prevent them from doing so, but it should.  Sadly, in this 
mode, women’s issues consistently lose out as a priority. 
C.  The Donor-Driven Reconstruction Process 
Those who provide the funds set the tone for postconflict recon-
struction.99  When it comes to economic engineering, this is especially 
true.  Nation-states have multiple potential incentives for funding 
programs in postconflict Bosnia:  (1)  improving conditions within 
Bosnia to prevent further refugee flows across their own borders; (2) 
creating safe and stable neighbors with less likelihood of future war; 
(3) rendering markets and resources within the transitioning country 
available for interstate business transactions or purchases by compa-
nies within their own countries; and (4) creating a country that speaks 
the same political and economic language, so that negotiations can 
take place on terms with which the donor state is familiar and in 
which the donor state has confidence. 
Since donors have particular interests in the way the recon-
structed state will look and act, they often place restrictions on the 
purposes for which their monies may be used.  These restrictions are 
often criticized for being earmarked for “sexy” issues rather than 
those that are sorely needed but not as chic or “of the moment.”100  As 
discussed above, women’s issues have, unfortunately, not yet attained 
this trendy status in reconstruction.101  Unless this changes and gender 
issues become “of the moment,” it is exceedingly unlikely that they 
99 See id. at 21 (“[D]onor countries and entities . . . considered their own political 
or economic motivations for a particular funding emphasis . . . .”). 
100 What is “sexy” or “of the moment” is usually time and place specific.  For in-
stance, between 1999 and 2001, many people working on property repossession and 
(refugee and displaced-person) return urged donors to fund programs such as improv-
ing laws and policies to encourage nondiscrimination.  Observing that encouraging 
displaced persons and refugees to return to their prewar communities was an IC prior-
ity, we understood that refugees were reluctant to return until they knew that they 
would not face danger and discrimination and that they would be able to find work, 
send their children to school, and go about their daily lives without fear.  Nevertheless, 
most donors insisted on spending their money constructing houses.  The donors felt 
that building houses was concrete, quantifiable, and identifiable.  The result was that 
much money was spent on houses that remained empty because displaced persons did 
not feel comfortable returning.  In this example, constructing houses was deemed 
“sexy” and “of the moment” by donors.   
101 See supra Section II.B (discussing the failure of gender mainstreaming to catch 
on in the postconflict reconstruction arena). 
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will garner the attention of the donor states whose monies and inter-
ests drive the postconflict reconstruction process. 
III.  THE DEMOCRATIZATION/NEOLIBERALISM/GENDER TRIFECTA 
Arguably, the entire postwar State of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
construct of the IC and its liberal economic order.  The Preamble to 
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexed to the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace, sets forth the democratic principles 
believed to be necessary for reconstructing the country and securing 
sustainable peace within it.102  These include engaging in “democrati-
zation” and the “promotion of a market economy.”103  Placing a mar-
ket economy’s promotion in a central, foundational position was nei-
ther an afterthought nor merely one piece in an overarching plan for 
reconstruction.  It was one of the fundamental goals of the process. 
A.  Democratization in the Postconflict Reconstruction Agenda 
Democratization has become the transitional governance norm in 
postconflict reconstruction and international interventions.104  For 
better or worse, every postconflict reconstruction administration since 
the end of the Cold War has made democratization a priority.105  
While honed during the so-called third-wave transition, when a multi-
tude of countries were transitioning politically from fascism or social-
ism,106 all postconflict reconstruction operations now contain a strong 
democratization component.  This is evidenced by the fact that the 
term “democratization” has become virtually synonymous with the es-
102 CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA pmbl.; see also Framework, supra 
note 5, Annex 4. 
103 CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA pmbl. 
104 See Georgina Waylen, Women and Democratization:  Conceptualizing Gender Rela-
tions in Transition Politics, 46 WORLD POL. 327, 330 (1994) (addressing the postconflict 
focus on democracy and the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic 
governance); see also ANU PILLAY, GENDER, PEACE AND PEACEKEEPING:  LESSONS FROM 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 4 (Inst. for Sec. Studies, Paper 128, 2006) (calling democratization 
one of the “four main inter-related components” of peacebuilding, along with demili-
tarization, social reconstruction, and development). 
105 See Jean d’Aspremont, Post-Conflict Administrations as Democracy-Building Instru-
ments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2008) (“[T]he establishment of democratic institutions 
has been systematically included in the mandate of all post-conflict administrations 
since the end of the Cold War.”); see also Waylen, supra note 104, at 330 (calling demo-
cratization “unashamedly normative”). 
106 See Waylen, supra note 104, at 330. 
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tablishment or reestablishment of functioning and stable political-
governance mechanisms and infrastructure.107 
The IC in Bosnia prioritized the establishment of democracy in 
the postwar nation.  Many scholars have subsequently critiqued this 
prioritization.  One such critique argues for the organic growth of 
democracies, questioning the very notion of international administra-
tion108 and, specifically, the unwillingness of the IC to relinquish con-
trol.  The critique holds that even if the incipient democracy brims 
with the mistakes of uneducated, corrupt, nationalistic, or self-
interested officials, such officials are nevertheless elected officials.109  
Another position critiques the IC idealization of elections as a vehicle 
for instant democracy, arguing that elections can give the stamp of 
democratic legitimacy to the very people responsible for the war by 
entrenching them in power, thus exacerbating conflict.110  A third cri-
107 See d’Aspremont, supra note 105, at 5 (“[D]emocracy has become a fundamen-
tal criterion for the legitimatization of governments in the sense that, nowadays, a new 
government hardly qualifies as the legitimate representative of a state if it has not been 
democratically elected.”).  
108 Some postconflict reconstruction scenarios—Bosnia, the District of Brcko with-
in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan—have the additional element of in-
ternational administration, whereby the IC, with the sanction and legal endorsement 
of the United Nations, becomes a partial or total governance body during part of the 
postconflict political-transition process.  See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HER-
ZEGOVINA art. IX (obliging parties to “cooperate fully” with any future Annexes to the 
Dayton Framework authorized by the U.N. Security Council); S.C. Res. 1483, para. 9, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (supporting the Iraqi people in forming an 
international administration run by Iraqis); S.C. Res. 1383, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001) (endorsing the establishment of provisional “arrange-
ments in Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of permanent government institu-
tions”); S.C. Res. 1264, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999) (authorizing 
international forces to restore peace in East Timor); S.C. Res. 1244, para. 10, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1244 ( June 10, 1999) (placing Kosovo under U.N. administration to en-
sure development of democratic institutions); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secre-
tary-General on the Situation in East Timor, para. 26, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. S/1999/1024 (Oct. 4, 1999) (proposing a transitional U.N. administration for 
East Timor); see also Haynes, supra note 4, at 21-25 (providing detailed descriptions of 
the nature of international administration in war-torn nations). 
109 See CHANDLER, supra note 59, at 199 (arguing that true democracy may come 
from the inside without international intervention); see also Haynes, supra note 4, at 13 
(critiquing the incidence of “governance by fiat”); Sebastian van de Vliet, Addressing 
Corruption and Organized Crime in the Context of Re-establishing the Rule of Law (discussing 
the High Representative’s practice of removing democratically elected officials from 
office for failing to carry out Dayton Framework principles and objectives), in DECON-
STRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 205, 212-14. 
110 See Nancy Bermeo, What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About 
Postwar Democratization, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 159, 172 (2003) (discussing how the 
process of democratization must overcome the “challenge of reforming or neutralizing 
the problematic parties that already exist”).  In the case of Bosnia, however, one would 
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tique cautions that the process of rendering or requiring democracy 
can be rightly perceived as deeply paternalistic, which should give 
pause to those hoping to avoid charges that international administra-
tion is a new Colonialism.111  A final critique, most important for wom-
en, is that the IC’s emphasis on superficial procedural identifiers of 
democracy often comes at the expense of substantive democratic 
rights such as equality.112  Under this critique, democratization alone 
fails to achieve gender equity and likely even fails to achieve sustaina-
ble peace.113  Where people are insecure and do not have equal rights 
and opportunities, strife is likely. 
A more cynical critic might also note that democracy’s intimate 
links with capitalism pose a further problem, particularly when the so-
ciety in question is transitioning both politically and economically, as 
was the case in Bosnia.  Donor states, and the multinational corpora-
tions within them, prefer a certain amount of political stability before 
they invest in rebuilding efforts.  But when democratization and market 
liberalization are so closely intertwined, democracy is susceptible to be-
ing seen as nothing more than a thinly disguised mechanism for estab-
lishing a capitalist free market as quickly as possible.  This linkage has 
also the tainted feel of a sociopolitical engineering project designed to 
create a safe new nation-state.  Only here, safety is synonymous with 
sharing political and economic principles with the donor states.  A safe 
state is thus one open to investment and exploitation through donor 
states’ preferred economic and political mechanisms. 
have to acknowledge that the nationalists in question had already been legitimized:  
first by popular support during the war and second by their inclusion in the Dayton 
negotiations.  See Haynes, supra note 4, at 14-20. 
111 See Mats Berdal & Richard Caplan, The Politics of International Administration, 
10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 3 (2004) (“When does ‘benign’ administration become 
neocolonialism and how is it to be avoided?”); Matteo Tondini, From Neo-Colonialism 
to a “Light-Footprint Approach”:  Restoring Justice Systems, 15 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 237, 
238 (2008) (“Whatever the role of international agencies in reforming the legal sys-
tems of post-conflict countries, it has inevitably implied a form of cultural influence 
and/or imposition.”). 
112 For instance, observers of the reconstruction process in Bosnia now widely believe 
that holding elections in 1996 was a mistake.  The “elections legitimized the nationalists 
who rose to power in the wake of purged ethnicities,” and the elections themselves were 
rife with fraud.  See Haynes, supra note 4, at 14; see also Waylen, supra note 104, at 332 
(noting that classical democracy scholars concentrated narrowly on “democracy as simply 
an institutional arrangement [such that] wider definitions of democracy couched in 
terms of the real distribution of power in society are considered illegitimate”). 
113 See, e.g., Waylen, supra note 104, at 327, 335 (remarking that “a narrow focus on 
democratization is insufficient for understanding its interaction with gender relations, as 
institutional democratization does not necessarily entail any wider changes,” and noting 
that, until recently, the democratization literature made little mention of gender). 
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B.  Neoliberalism in the Postconflict Reconstruction Agenda 
The emergence of a number of new—and newly independent—
states in the last half century,114 many of which were ripe for both po-
litical and economic transition, has led the IC to conflate postconflict 
reconstruction and development with economic liberalization.  Neoli-
beralism has been critiqued heavily in the South and East, often in the 
context of postcolonial scholarship.  Neoliberalism’s opponents de-
scribe it as “[t]he policies of privatization, austerity, and trade liberali-
zation accepted willingly or unwillingly by the governments of depen-
dent countries as a condition of approval of investment, loans, and 
debt relief by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.”115  Those more favorably inclined describe it as “[a] view of the 
world that favors social justice while also emphasizing economic 
growth, efficiency, and the benefits of free markets.”116 
During the post–Cold War period of economic and political tran-
sition, it became standard practice for Western countries and Western-
dominated institutions to urge the market liberalization of socialist 
states.117  This practice had harsh gender consequences throughout 
the former Soviet Union.  After all, one of the primary components of 
the great communist experiment had been gender equity.118  Women’s 
participation in the labor markets in former Soviet states, in particular 
within industrial and technical fields, had risen to levels surpassing the 
West.119  In the FRY,120 as the communist regime collapsed and the 
114 These states include Bosnia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 
Republic of the Congo, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
115 BENJAMIN KEEN & KEITH HAYNES, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, at xiii (8th ed. 
2009); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Op-Ed., The End of Neo-Liberalism?, NEW EUROPE, July 
20-26, 2008, at 3 (“The world has not been kind to neoliberalism, that grab-bag of 
ideas based on the fundamentalist notion that markets are self-correcting, allocate re-
sources efficiently, and serve the public interest well.  It was this market fundamental-
ism that underlay Thatcherism, Reaganomics, and the so-called ‘Washington Consen-
sus’ in favor of privatization, liberalization, and independent central banks focusing 
single-mindedly on inflation.”). 
116 ALAN V. DEARDORFF, TERMS OF TRADE:  GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOM-
ICS 188 (2006).  
117 See Sean Gervasi, Germany, U.S., and the Yugoslav Crisis, COVERTACTION, Winter 
1992–1993, at 41, 42. 
118 See R.W. CONNELL, GENDER 23 (2002) (“One of the great experiments in gend-
er equality was undertaken by the Soviet Union.”). 
119 See id. (“Women’s participation in industry and other forms of technical em-
ployment rose to levels never matched in the capitalist ‘West.’”). 
120 Before the war and its dissolution, FRY consisted of present-day Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. 
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West began pushing liberal market policies, women disappeared from 
the political scene.  As the IMF and World Bank pressured FRY to pri-
vatize state-owned companies and reduce the workforce, women dis-
appeared from the workforce as well.121 
Some scholars, however, argue that the gains made by women un-
der communism were only superficial.  For example, while women 
held more seats in parliament in the USSR than ever before in history, 
more even than women in other western legislative bodies, the USSR 
parliament had no power.122  The fact that such gains were hollow 
lends credence to the critique that a focus on political and procedural 
rights often comes at the expense of considering substantive econom-
ic and social rights.123  In the postconflict reconstruction context, this 
provides a strong empirical argument for going beyond mere inclu-
sion of women in the political process.  The USSR example shows that 
male patriarchies could pretend to make women equal by placing 
them in political institutions while withholding real power and subs-
tantive gains.  That this occurred in a communist system rather than 
in a democratic system tends only to support the feminist argument 
that it is the state itself—not the particular political or economic phi-
losophy employed by the state—that is patriarchal.124  Both communist 
states and capitalist democratic states have equal potential for limiting 
women’s gains. 
Bosnia is unique among former socialist states in that it also suf-
fered a war.  It is unique among postconflict states in that it also suf-
fered a transitioning economy.  While many ex-Soviet and Eastern Eu-
ropean economies that experienced difficulty transitioning from 
communism and socialism to more liberal political and economic sys-
121 Cf. Haynes, supra note 30, at 226 n.17 (citing statistics showing that about se-
venty percent of the unemployed in Russia were women). 
122 See CONNELL, supra note 118, at 25 (“Women won a higher proportion of seats 
in Soviet parliaments than in almost any other part of the world—but the Soviet par-
liaments had no power.”); see also Tatjana Djuric Kuzmanovic, Introduction to Feminist 
Economics:  Household, Market and State, J. FOR POL. THEORY & RES. ON GLOBALIZATION, 
DEV. & GENDER ISSUES, http://www.globalizacija.com/doc_en/e0017ram.htm (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010) (arguing that in Serbia, although women were supposed to be 
equal partners under the prewar socialist economy, “[i]n reality, patriarchal gender 
regimes dominated women’s lives inside the household, and gender inequalities re-
mained present both in the private and public spheres . . . . Women were more com-
monly employed in poorly paid industries . . . [and] received 15% lower salaries.”).  
123 See CONNELL, supra note 118, at 104 (“Theories of the state tend to forget that 
the state is only one of society’s centres of power.”). 
124 See id. at 103-04 (describing the “obvious” reasons why feminists have viewed 
the state as a patriarchal institution). 
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tems can provide useful points of comparison to Bosnia, these transi-
tional difficulties were hugely exacerbated in Bosnia by the war.  Its 
nascent, transitioning economy was destroyed.  Even before Bosnia 
became a state or the war began, the IC—in the guise of the IMF—was 
pressuring FRY to begin liberalizing its markets.125  After the war, mar-
ket liberalization became a primary tenet of the reconstruction—
embedded in the very Constitution of the new country.126  The market 
liberalization that was underway became conflated with the postcon-
flict reconstruction process. 
C.  Gender in the Postconflict Reconstruction Agenda 
1.  Failure to Consider Gender Issues in Bosnia 
Women were certainly highlighted as unique victims of the war in 
Bosnia,127 but they were not included at the peace negotiations, and 
their particular needs and interests were not considered in any part of 
the Dayton Framework.128  Women were ignored by the international 
entities purporting to reconstruct the country, despite the frequent 
invocation of the heinous crimes committed against women as a basis 
and legal justification for international intervention during the war.129 
125 See Gervasi, supra note 117, at 43.  See generally BELL, supra note 4, at 91-117 
(discussing the role of the IC in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
126 See CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA pmbl.  The Constitution and 
another Annex to the Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace hand control 
of much of Bosnian economic policy to Bretton Woods institutions and the London-
based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).  Id.; Framework, 
supra note 5, Annex 9.  Article VII of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina sti-
pulates that the first governor of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be 
appointed by the IMF.  CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA art. VII, § 2.  The 
EBRD appoints the chairman of the Bosnian Commission on Public Corporations, 
which supervises operations of all public sector enterprises and restructuring, includ-
ing the sell-off of State and socially owned assets and the procurement of long-term 
investment funds.  Framework, supra note 5, Annex 9, art. I. 
127 The horrific practice of systematically raping women in Bosnia gave rise to a 
new understanding of rape as a war crime under international law.  See generally MASS 
RAPE:  THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 
Marion Faber trans., 1994) (collecting essays on the systematic rape of women in post-
conflict Bosnia that argue for recognition of mass rape as a war crime).  
128 See Rees, supra note 12, at 55-58 (arguing that it was shocking that so many in-
ternational players and institutions failed to include a gender dimension when setting 
forth the rules by which an entire country would be reconstructed and that this omis-
sion was particularly egregious given the gendered dimension of some of the most 
heinous crimes committed during this war). 
129 See, e.g., General Assembly, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Annual Report to the Secretary-General, paras. 732-757, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Apr. 12, 
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The IC established a mission to reconstruct and democratize 
Bosnia.130  The mission, however, was strong on procedural democra-
cy (free and fair elections) and weak on substantive democracy 
(equality and fairness), particularly during the first five years after 
cessation of hostilities.  Due to the strong emphasis on procedural 
democracy and the heavy criticism of the IC for having organized 
elections too early, the IC left itself open to charges that its “demo-
cratization” was really just a cover for “capitalism.”131  The link be-
tween democracy and human rights only emerged later, when the IC 
got around to creating and strengthening human rights institutions 
(e.g., the Human Rights Chamber and the Ombudsmen) and the 
rule of law (e.g., the Constitutional Court and the vetting of judges 
appointed under the old regimes).  By then, however, so much had 
been made of liberalizing Bosnia’s market, and so little of the subs-
tantive inequities in that market, that there was almost no place for 
discussion of social and economic rights. 
The same pattern occurred with regard to human rights.  It was 
the “hard” procedural rights most familiar to western neoliberal states 
(political and civil rights embodied in election laws and criminal 
codes) that took precedence, while the “soft” rights (social, cultural, 
and economic) received little or no attention.132 
The IC is best at the procedural and visible aspects of gender 
mainstreaming, for example, putting women into elected office.133  
1994) (discussing the atrocities perpetrated against women and the need to help these 
women on an international level).  But see Yugoslavia:  Whose Bloody War?, 
http://flag.blackened.net/revolt//ws93/yugoslavia.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (ar-
guing that although women needed assistance, they could not hope to get it from foreign 
militaries, which have their own histories of rape and sexual exploitation).  
130 See Haynes, supra note 4, at 7-12 (discussing the IC’s goals and efforts in recon-
struction). 
131 Cf. Elizabeth H. Crighton, Beyond Neoliberalism:  Peacemaking in Northern Ireland, 
25 SOC. JUST. 75, 75 (1998) (noting that, in contrast with many other places, Northern 
Ireland avoided neoliberal social and economic engineering); Paul Williams & Ian 
Taylor, Neoliberalism and the Political Economy of the ‘New’ South Africa, 5 NEW POL. ECON. 
21, 26 (2000) (remarking that, with respect to having market liberalization foisted 
upon South Africa, “representatives of big business continued their educational 
‘charm offensive’ on the ANC elite,” saving the country from suffering Bosnia’s fate). 
132 Ironically, the American Supervisors of Brcko were slightly more attentive than 
the rest of the IC in Bosnia to soft rights and substantive democracy.  See, e.g., Jeffrey, 
supra note 27, at 216 (discussing the Supervisor’s priority of imposing “multi-ethnic 
schooling” in Brcko despite deep local opposition). 
133 See Martha Walsh, Aftermath:  The Impact of Conflict on Women in Bosnia and Herze-
govina 10 (Ctr. for Dev. Info. & Evaluation, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Working Paper 
No. 302, 2000), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACJ322.pdf (“After the 
first postconflict elections in 1996, there was a massive retrenchment of women from 
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Unsurprisingly, many have argued—as was argued above with regard 
to the USSR—that the federal politicians in both Bosnia and Kosovo 
have little, if any, real power.134  If those electoral bodies have no real 
political authority, then women’s participation in those institutions is 
largely meaningless. 
Some gender scholars argue that women can actually exercise 
more power from within NGOs and other “alternative” institutions or 
in economic, cultural, and social, rather than political, spheres of 
power.135  In Bosnia, women were virtually invisible in the initial Day-
ton-based negotiations regarding political and governance structures, 
but they dominated civil society, both with respect to their representa-
tion in numbers and the fact that women created and ran many of the 
NGOs that sprang up after the war.136  Potentially motivating institu-
tional emphasis on women’s political or civil involvement in Bosnia is 
the ever-present desire for accession to the Council of Europe and ul-
public life.  In the BiH House of Representatives (which represents both entities), only 
one woman was elected to the 42-seat chamber (2.38 percent).  In the Federation, 
women were elected to 7 seats out of 140 (5 percent), while in the RS Parliament only 
2 out of 106 seats (1.89 percent) were won by women.”). 
134 See, e.g., id. (“As part of the socialist egalitarian system, there was a quota for 
women’s representation in government.  In 1986, women constituted 24.1 percent of 
the Assembly of the Republic of BiH and 17.3 percent of representatives of municipal 
assemblies.  However, a number of Bosnian women commented that women elected to 
office under this system were politically connected and the relatively high rates of 
women’s participation did not reflect commitment to visibility of women in politics.” (empha-
sis added) (citations omitted)); see also Waters, supra note 35 (arguing that in postcon-
flict Bosnia, the entities (RS and Federation) hold the real power while the IC-created 
federal government holds little).   
135 See, e.g., Kathleen O’Reilly, Women Fieldworkers and the Politics of Participation, 31 SIGNS 
1075, 1094-95 (2006) (discussing changes that women working for NGOs cause to be im-
plemented); Cockburn, supra note 40, at 8 (“[L]ocal women’s NGOs must be consulted, 
befriended, made partners with the international community and have equal rights in the 
process.”); Andrea Cornwall, Pathways of Women’s Empowerment, 50.50, July 30, 2007, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/pathways_of_womens_empowerment (explaining 
that the means to empower women have changed in recent times to a focus on personal 
power, agency, and making choices).  This is also consistent with my experience interacting 
with postwar Bosnian NGOs.  In Bosnia, NGOs and even the Bosnian government were far 
more adept at recognizing the importance of gender in postwar reconstruction than the IC 
was.  See Rees, supra note 12, at 51; see also CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74 (ar-
guing that women may make more gains within and through civil society rather than within 
formal electoral power structures). 
136 See CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74.  Alternatively, some argue that 
women organize through civil society and seek to reclaim the home as a space, in or-
der to recover from the trauma of war.  They do so precisely because it is outside of the 
political and public spheres.  See Walsh, supra note 133, at 4 (“[W]omen in the imme-
diate aftermath of the conflict sought . . . the life they led before the war.”). 
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timately entry into the European Union.137  This underlying motiva-
tion gives rise to a real question whether women’s involvement is 
meant to bring women onto the playing field as equal power holders 
or merely to allow Bosnia to check off a “gender mainstreaming” box 
toward accession.138 
Gender scholars in the Balkans also question the inconsistent atten-
tion of the western interveners who sometimes treat women in Bosnia 
as “‘a blind spot’ . . . prevalent [only for their] non-presence, ‘footnote’ 
presence or ‘case study’ presence,” and other times as “everyone’s case 
study” and the “face/body of (post)war trauma” in Bosnia.139  Women, 
along with their pain and suffering, are used not only by internationals 
but also by their own nationalist brethren.  The Bosnian woman has 
gone “[f]rom being the idealised working woman of socialist rhetoric 
[to] . . . the equally idealised ‘mother of the nation.’”140 
When rare efforts are made to include women in postconflict de-
velopment concepts, the women in question are often essentialized—
reduced to their victimhood—with postconflict redress limited to po-
tential criminal prosecution of their brutalizers.141  Despite primarily po-
litical efforts at gender mainstreaming, activities like human trafficking 
take place in Bosnia because women in Bosnia (not just Bosnian wom-
en) are not spoken to, consulted, or truly seen.  Bosnian women who 
feel, as stated above, that they represent the “face/body” of postwar 
trauma, when coupled with newfound postprivatization unemployment, 
might reasonably feel that they are pawns in a neoliberal enterprise. 
Bosnian women are struggling to find their own voices.  In so 
doing, they have had to peel off layer upon layer of narratives foisted 
upon them by the IC, many of which fail to take them into account or 
exist only to satisfy the required gender-mainstreaming components 
of the various reconstruction programs.  Gender is important to con-
sider in the reconstruction of a country because “[a] gender perspec-
137 See CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74. 
138 See infra Part IV; cf. CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74 (pointing out 
that with respect to women’s equality, “de facto change is not [a] simple consequence 
of de jure change”). 
139 Dr. Jasmina Husanovic, Associate Professor in Cultural Studies, Univ. of Tuzla, 
Remarks at Gender, Empire, and the Politics of Central and Eastern Europe:  A Gen-
der Symposium (May 17-18, 2007). 
140 Wendy Bracewell, ‘Mothers of the Nation,’ WAR REP., Sept. 1995, at 27, 27. 
141 See CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74 (discussing the limited response 
of most postconflict processes, which reduce women to victims who are only useful in 
the prosecution of their abusers when the abuse is deemed to rise to the level of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity).  
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tive makes the differences in power between women and men from 
different communities visible.  This requires highlighting the expe-
riences of women because, relative to men’s experiences, they have 
been largely invisible.”142 
Women in the Balkans can lead the way in thinking about the im-
pacts of economic policy on women because of their unique vantage 
point in experiencing simultaneous economic and political transition, 
war, and reconstruction.  As postcolonial feminists argue, for Bosnian 
women to move forward, they must resist the neoliberal agenda.  They 
must, in the words of one postcolonial feminist, “[create an] anticapi-
talist transnational feminist practice—and on the possibilities, indeed 
on the necessities, of cross-national feminist solidarity and organizing 
against capitalism.”143 
One line of scholarly inquiry links the subservient nature of the 
postwar state of Bosnia with its fledgling yet complicated federal sove-
reign structures and its internationally supported economy.  Indeed, 
some have referred to the country of Bosnia as a “courtesan state,” 
prostituting itself and sublimating the will of its people in order to se-
cure essential international economic assistance.144  Bosnia is thus en-
slaved to the West by its need for money and global acceptance—
mirroring the enslaved condition of some of its women.  The problem 
of the “courtesan state” is not limited to Bosnia but is shared by all the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia that were involved in the war and 
that lack direct access to European and world markets.145 
142 SUZANNA DENNIS & ELAINE ZUCKERMAN, GENDER GUIDE TO WORLD BANK AND 
IMF POLICY-BASED LENDING 2 (2006), available at http://www.genderaction.org/images/ 
GA%20Gender%20Guide%20to%20World%20Bank%20and%20IMF%20FINAL.pdf. 
143 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes” Revisited:  Feminist Solidarity 
Through Anticapitalist Struggles, 28 SIGNS 499, 509 (2002); see also Ambreena Manji, ‘The 
Beautyful Ones’ of Law and Development (critiquing market-oriented development models 
and suggesting that the continuity of the global capitalist order be scrutinized), in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW:  MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 59, 169-71 (Doris Buss & Ambree-
na Manji eds., 2005). 
144 See, e.g., James H. Mittelman & Robert Johnston, The Globalization of Organized 
Crime, the Courtesan State, and the Corruption of Civil Society, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 103, 
117 (1999) (explaining the problems inherent in the courtesan state “in which the 
state does not provide social protection for its young women and men . . . but rather 
tacitly forsakes safeguarding the local culture in favor of global market forces”).  In 
particular, Bosnia offers services to wealthy foreign interests while ignoring the need 
for social services for its own lower class.  In place of the state, organized crime steps in 
to bridge this gap.  Id. at 117-18. 
145 Examples of other courtesan states include Serbia and Montenegro.  For in-
stance, Global Balkans, a research network, in discussing the scope of reconstruction 
issues, states, “The post-intervention period . . . is known as the ‘tranzicija’ or ‘transi-
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There are also broader critiques of economic liberalization.  One 
is that internationals use the label “economic empowerment” to sug-
gest that their goal is to assist the country in gaining economic power.  
In reality, the aim is to help the country so that it can engage in the 
world market to the benefit of those very internationals.  The “eco-
nomic empowerment” model thus serves as a means of legitimating 
western hegemonic notions of a market economy without having to 
confront the underlying conditions of social inequality that cause po-
verty.146  Indeed, though this model might advocate increased em-
ployment for women, such a simplistic emphasis could backfire, re-
sulting in cheap labor, exploitation, or even more human trafficking. 
Among the local populations, not everyone finds the new eco-
nomic order beneficial to them or their country.147  Women who have 
lived through economic transitions and have experienced assistance 
(or interference) from the IC have been thinking about the gendered 
aspects of economics for some time,148 and the IC would do well to lis-
ten and incorporate some of those thoughts into their postconflict re-
construction programs. 
2.  Lessons from Development Theory 
That the IC would sponsor a market for men engaged in black 
market activities and assume that it would engender interethnic har-
mony calls to mind “appropriate technology” stories from the interna-
tional-development world.  Many such technology stories, like this 
tion’ in Serbia.  What we are witnessing now is an accelerated privatization program, 
mass unemployment, massive impoverishment following upon ten years of war, the 
highest number of refugees and internally displaced people in Europe.”  Interview by 
Global Balkans with Tariq Ali (Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Interview with Tariq Ali], 
transcript available at http://www.counterpunch.org/gb02262008.html. 
146 See, e.g., Deborah M. Weissman, Gender and Human Rights:  Between Morals and 
Politics (discussing the World Bank’s economic policy toward women and arguing 
that it is “unrelated to themes of justice and equality”), in GENDER EQUALITY:  DI-
MENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 409, 426 (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. 
Grossman eds., 2009). 
147 See, e.g., Interview with Tariq Ali, supra note 145 (“I don’t think that transition to a 
neoliberal state run on neoliberal lines with the market determining everything can help 
the citizens of that state, whatever it is.  So it is going to be and it is being—as we know—a 
messy and one-sided transition which will not benefit the bulk of the population.”). 
148 See, e.g., Sandra Harding, Can Feminist Thought Make Economics More Objective?, 1 
FEMINIST ECON. 7, 20-23 (1995) (explaining that gender is expressed in the economy 
and society in three ways:  (1) through economic structures such as segregated mar-
kets, wage discrimination, and division of labor; (2) through symbolic differences such 
as masculine and feminine job characteristics and paid versus unpaid work; and (3) 
through identity expressed in preferences, beliefs, and metaphors). 
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one, have a gender angle.  In 1990, a development organization 
passed through a town in Chad, spoke with the local leaders, and ul-
timately presented every household with a new, efficient wood-
burning stove.  The goal was to reduce the amount of wood burned, 
as people (women and girls) were walking farther each day to find 
firewood with which to cook.  The stoves were lovely.  They sat low to 
the ground and had three openings so that logs could be inserted 
from three sides and pushed in as they burned inside the stove.  The 
stoves were so efficient that three logs would last for days.  The devel-
opment organization in question spent $1 million on the project.  
Over the year following their distribution, however, the stoves were 
used instead as stools to sit on when guests came to visit at friends’ 
houses.  When the development agency returned a year later to eva-
luate the success of the project, they discovered the stoves being used 
as stools.  At this point, and only at this point, did they consult the 
women of the town, asking them why they were not using the stoves 
for cooking.  The women informed them that they always kept fires 
burning inside their houses to keep the bugs and snakes out.  Had the 
organization ever asked a woman whether she would use a stove 
created for outdoor use, they would have learned that their project 
was worthless.  But they never asked. 
This example illustrates many things about culture, gender, and the 
dynamics of giving and receiving aid.149  It also parallels the Arizona 
Market experience, in that internationals did not ask what their support 
for Arizona Market would be used to achieve.150  Ensuring that the neo-
149 It also illustrates the concept of metis, the notion that the best instincts about a 
place—the best understanding and knowledge—will be held by the locals, who should 
be consulted before investments of time and money are made.  See SCOTT, supra note 
61, at 319 (“[A]ny formula that excludes or suppresses the experience, knowledge, and 
adaptability of metis risks incoherence and failure; learning to speak coherent sen-
tences involves far more than merely learning the rules of grammar.” (italics added)).  
Development theory has, therefore, become much more “ground up” and less “top 
down” in recent decades.  But another level of understanding has yet to be adopted by 
those in the field of postconflict reconstruction.  “Only by grasping the potential 
achievement and range of metis is it possible to appreciate the valuable knowledge that 
high-modernist schemes deprive themselves of when they simply impose their plans,” 
and capitalism kills metis.  Id. at 323, 335 (italics added). 
150 In fact, as to Bosnia as a whole, no one asked what work had already been done 
on the topic of women in war.  No one even considered women.  See Rees, supra note 
12, at 54 (“Gender issues never surfaced in the [General Framework] drafting 
process.”).  As Rees points out, a World Conference on women had been held in the 
very year the General Framework Agreement was drafted.  Id. at 56.  At the World Con-
ference, a Platform for Action was drawn up, which developed, in a section entitled 
“Women and Armed Conflict,” plans as to what the U.N. and NGOs should do to take 
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liberal dream and the myth of the free market materialized in the form 
of an actual market was the beginning and end of the inquiry.  Whereas 
those in the development world have arguably learned from past fail-
ures to take women into consideration and have rectified the situation 
by developing doctrine and policies to take gender into account,151 it is 
not at all clear that those lessons have been normalized and incorpo-
rated into postconflict reconstruction discourse. 
In the context of international intervention and postconflict re-
construction, the conditions imposed upon acceptance of the neoli-
beral agenda may have undesirable consequences.  In order to receive 
financial assistance or EU accession, for example, Bosnia must con-
tinue to privatize, downsize, and liberalize its economy, even if those 
policies have a negative impact on social justice in the polity.  Put dif-
ferently, the interveners mistakenly assume that the free market is a 
force majeure with the potential even to correct for social injustice.  In a 
country rife with ethnic conflict, the international interveners should 
instead be setting social justice as the primary goal, not just assuming 
that the market will correct for economic, ethnic, and social inequi-
ties.  Those supporting Arizona Market appeared to operate accord-
ing to the mistaken belief that the free market would correct for eth-
nic disharmony, creating a business space in which strife would fall 
away in favor of money making.  This belief presupposed the certainty 
of free market economics.  But economics is not science, even when 
practiced by economists.152 
into account the impact of war on women.  Id. at 57.  Nevertheless, none of that think-
ing and planning was considered when developing plans for the reconstruction of 
Bosnia.  Id. at 57. 
151 See, e.g., Elizabeth Durbin, Towards a Gendered Human Poverty Measure, 5 FEMINIST 
ECON. 105, 105 (1999) (advocating alternative gender indicators for measuring the human 
dimensions of development in terms of the choices and opportunities women and men 
face); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction:  Dilemmas and Directions, 
12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335, 338 (2006) (“Integrating gender in the post-conflict 
process specifically includes . . . proceeding upon the recognition that sustainable develop-
ment requires gender equity.”); Maria Eitel, For the First Time in History, Girls Were All over Da-
vos, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maria-eitel/for-the-
first-time-in-his_b_163362.html (quoting U.S. Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY), who re-
marked, “I’m hoping there will continue to be a focus on girls because they are really so key 
to successful development and progress”).   
152 See Ass’n for Women’s Rights in Dev., Ten Principles for Challenging Neoliberal Globa-
lization, J. FOR POL. THEORY & RES. ON GLOBALISATION, DEV. & GENDER ISSUES, http:// 
www.globalizacija.com/doc_en/e0024neo.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“Economics is 
often represented as technical and scientific, based on ‘truths’ from mathematics or sta-
tistics.  However, economic policy is profoundly political and represents a certain set of 
subjective assumptions about power and the distribution of resources.”). 
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IV.  THE IMPACT OF NEOLIBERALISM ON WOMEN 
When the IC arrives to work on “traditional” postconflict recon-
struction programs, it also begins to regulate—sometimes persuasively 
and sometimes through direct intervention—the political and eco-
nomic systems and the political and economic rights ultimately 
adopted within these transitioning and postconflict states.153 
Neoliberal economic strategies include deregulating markets, re-
ducing taxes and government services, and privatizing business and 
property.  These economic policies often have extremely gendered 
outcomes that are almost always detrimental to women. 
A.  Privatization of Business 
One of the first steps of economic liberalization is to privatize any 
business owned or run by the government or the workers.  The gen-
dered impact of this policy is immediately evident.  Resources are 
shifted into male-dominated corporations and market mechanisms.154  
As businesses and factories are privatized, the neoliberal agenda re-
quires business streamlining.  Not every member of the polity can be 
employed in a nonsocialist state.  Some people have to be fired to 
make operations more efficient and competitive in the new, free mar-
ket.  This was a basic prerequisite of IMF and World Bank financial as-
sistance to Bosnia.  One of the most marked human costs of economic 
transition from socialism to capitalism across the former Eastern Bloc 
has been the rise of gender inequity in the composition of the labor 
force.  Women are the first to be downsized or laid off.155 
153 See d’Aspremont, supra note 105, at 1 (arguing that democracy building is a 
positive trend, as stable democratic states within the IC take an interest in reining in 
the “most erratic and unpredictable manifestations” of new statehood). 
154 See CONNELL, supra note 118, at 149-50 (“Men control almost all market-based 
institutions, such as corporations, and acquire most of the income distributed through 
markets, such as salaries and wages.  Neo-liberalism, in exalting the power of markets, 
has thus tended to restore the power and privilege of men.”); see also Waylen, supra 
note 104, at 327 (noting that the effects of democratization on women have not been 
adequately explored).  
155 In Hungary, when 30% of jobs disappeared, women’s employment levels de-
clined by nearly 24% between 1990 and 2001.  In Poland, women’s employment levels 
declined by nearly 8% over the same period.  In Argentina, where women comprised 
only 12.1% of the total workforce, women lost their jobs during economic transition at 
a much higher rate than men.  GEORGINA WAYLEN, ENGENDERING TRANSITIONS 181-82 
(2007); cf. Haynes, supra note 30, at 226 n.17 (citing sources stating that between se-
venty and eighty percent of the unemployed in Russia are women).  Similarly, many 
jobs were reserved for former military members, all of whom were men, effectively eli-
minating women from being hired postconflict and postprivatization.   
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Privatization changes employment patterns, and where jobs are 
downsized, women are the first to go.156  For example, in some coun-
tries where women were hugely underrepresented in the pretransition 
formal labor force, women’s participation in paid privatized employ-
ment can slightly increase with market reforms.157  In other instances, 
however, where women had been fully employed as part of the social-
ist policies of the pretransition state, those women lost across the 
board as a result of privatization.158 
The problem is that labor itself is gendered.  Not only are men in 
greater positions of earning power within privatized businesses, but in 
these new private markets the work done by women often goes unre-
cognized and undervalued.159  There are usually more men employed in 
the formal market than women.160  Further, more women are employed 
in public sector jobs than in private, and men dominate the private sec-
tor.  When public sector jobs are eradicated pursuant to neoliberal pol-
icies dictated by internationals, women lose jobs while men gain them 
as attention and funding are channeled into the private sector.  Women 
are typically underrepresented in the private sector, unless the particu-
lar private sector job is not particularly respected; as soon as it becomes 
desirable, men take over.161  Where women do make it into the private 
156 Kuzmanovic, supra note 122 (stating that Serbia’s Law on Privatization, passed 
in 2001, had the simultaneous negative effect of increasing the supply of available fe-
male laborers and decreasing the demand for women laborers); see also TAMAR SABE-
DASHVILI, GENDER AND DEMOCRATIZATION:  THE CASE OF GEORGIA 1991–2006, at 12 
(2007) (noting that women were most likely to be made redundant or have their pay 
cut during privatization in Georgia and that subsequent wages were so low that they 
would not cover the transportation costs of getting to and from the job). 
157 For example, in Brazil, the percentage of women in the workforce increased 
from 42.5% in 1990 to 44.5% in 1997 after market reforms were instituted; in Chile, 
the figure was 35.2%, up from 28%.  These increases came at the expense of male em-
ployment, which decreased.  WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 181. 
158 Id. at 181-82; see also Haynes, supra note 30, at 221 (noting that after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, Russian women contributed significantly to the supply side 
of trafficked women, due in part to the lack of employment alternatives). 
159 See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS 1999, at 73 (1999). 
160 See, e.g., Faranak Miraftab, Neoliberalism and Casualization of Public Sector Services:  
The Case of Waste Collection Services in Cape Town, South Africa, 28 INT’L J. URB. & RE-
GIONAL RES. 874, 877-78 (2004) (noting that women in South Africa dominate the in-
formal sector of domestic service). 
161 See WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 181-82 (citing statistics supporting the assertion 
that women in transitioning states bear higher unemployment rates); id. at 183-84 (cit-
ing the fact that women dominated the financial sectors in East Central Europe and 
Russia under socialism, but when those economic systems opened up and financial-
services jobs became desirable, men moved into the highest positions, surpassing 
women who had held those positions); Waylen, supra note 104, at 345. 
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sector, it is largely within the service industry.162  Women in higher so-
cioeconomic strata tend to retain or find employment, while women of 
lower socioeconomic status do not.163 
B.  Welfare Reforms 
Welfare reforms central to market liberalization also have a highly 
gendered impact.  Because women tend to rely more heavily on public 
services, the dismantling of socialism was particularly detrimental to 
them.164  This reliance results from women’s role as caretaker in most 
societies.165  Additionally, women and children make up the bulk of 
refugees and internally displaced persons, groups that depend most 
heavily on public services.166 
When state spending is cut at the behest of the internationals 
leading the governance reforms, women lose out.167  Most socialist (or 
even social democratic) regimes subsidized childcare, maternity leave, 
and parental leave.168  Under market reform, those programs get 
162 WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 183. 
163 Id. at 184. 
164 At the end of the war in Bosnia, around two-thirds of the population in that re-
gion was female.  See, e.g., SABEDASHVILI, supra note 156, at 11 (stating that women com-
prise fifty-five percent of all internally displaced persons).  According to the Women’s 
Refugee Commission, four out of five of the world’s nearly 45 million displaced people 
are women, children, and young people.  Women’s Refugee Comm’n, Gender, http:// 
www.womensrefugeecommission.org/programs/gender (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
165 WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 6-7; see also Julie Cupples, Counter-Revolutionary Women:  
Gender and Reconciliation in Post-War Nicaragua, GENDER & DEV., Nov. 2004, at 8, 9 (“[T]he 
new government promised to promote more traditional gender identities for women, and 
called for women to return to the home to be good wives and mothers . . . .”). 
166 See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTUR-
AL RIGHTS POST-CONFLICT 10 (2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/English/ 
issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf (discussing the particular vulnerabil-
ity of women and refugees to violations of social and economic rights). 
167 See Cupples, supra note 165, at 9 (arguing that the structural adjustment pro-
grams regularly required by the World Bank have a “distinctly gendered impact” in 
that the attendant reduction of social services that accompanies a liberalizing economy 
drastically increases the burdens on women, who become the caretakers for those for-
merly cared for in part by the government); Manji, supra note 143, at 169-71 (criti-
quing market-oriented development models, asking for analysis, and suggesting that 
the continuity of the global capitalist order be scrutinized). 
168 See, e.g., Heidi Gottfried, Report, In Defense of Socialized Child Care:  A Comparison 
of Child-Care Policy in the United States and Sweden, 1 NWSA J. 336, 337 (1988) (discussing 
subsidies); Valerie Polakow, Who Cares for the Children?:  Denmark’s Unique Childcare Mod-
el, 78 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 604, 604 (1997) (“In Denmark . . . the government has as-
sumed the cost of subsidizing a high-quality, comprehensive child-care system . . . .”). 
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cut.169  The result is that women, due to their traditional roles in the 
family—and in the case of the former Soviet countries, these were 
roles that were immediately resurrected after lying dormant for two to 
three generations—stay home to care for children and sick family 
members.  Finally, under market reform, wages are often decreased as 
positions become competitive, rendering it financially nonsensical for 
both parents to work when additional wages would not meet the costs 
of childcare.170 
C.  Other Social and Labor Reforms 
Under market liberalization, workers’ social security benefits are 
restructured.  This has a tremendously gendered outcome.  As state 
systems transition, social benefits accrue to the primary breadwinners, 
who tend to be men, because of the increasingly unfavorable wages 
for women.  Women contribute less to social security because they are 
paid less and tend to be employed for fewer years, as they stay home to 
care for children and aging relatives.  As a consequence, men’s eligi-
bility for social security typically vastly surpasses that of women.171 
D.  Privatization of Property 
One of the primary tenets of the neoliberal agenda is the privati-
zation of formerly socially held properties.  For the free market to 
work, businesses and homes may no longer be owned by the state.  
Privatization began in Bosnia even before the war:  The government 
would provide vouchers based on criteria such as age and military ser-
vice.  Recipients could exchange the vouchers for shares in privatized 
companies or sell them for cash.172  Similarly, after the war, the former 
socially owned apartments could be purchased under a complex 
scheme whereby people who had been displaced in the war could ap-
169 State funding for food subsidies and prenatal-nutrition programs is also cut 
under market reform, which disproportionately impacts women.  WAYLEN, supra note 
155, at 185-88. 
170 Cf. SABEDASHVILI, supra note 156, at 12 (stating, by way of comparison, that 
women in Georgia, during a similar market-liberalization process, were most likely to 
be made redundant or have their pay cut, and that subsequent wages were so low that 
they would not cover the transportation costs of getting to and from the job). 
171 See WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 191-92 (discussing social security restructuring).  
172 See Walsh, supra note 133, at 6 (noting that the “complicated” privatization sys-
tem in Bosnia uses vouchers that compensate for payments withheld during the war). 
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ply to repossess their former apartments, occupy them briefly, and 
then sell them.173 
After the war, both of these systems were corrupted by the contin-
ued pursuit of the wartime goal of ethnic cleansing.  Croatia, for in-
stance, refused to allow displaced minorities to repossess their socially 
held apartments during and immediately after the war.174  This effec-
tively prevented all Croatian Serbs who had been ejected during Op-
eration Storm from claiming ownership of their apartments.175  The 
apartments were then declared “abandoned” by the Croatian govern-
ment and given to Bosnian Croats, who had been invited by then-
President Franjo Tudjman to leave Bosnia and populate the formerly 
Croatian Serb–held sections of Croatia in the Krajina.176  Despite the 
blatant manipulation of the privatization process to carry out wartime 
objectives of ethnic cleansing in Croatia, the IC barely objected.  It was 
as if privatization itself was the only goal.  The creation of the market 
economy was all that mattered, regardless of whether those market 
processes were used to exclude people on the basis of race and there-
fore to effectively complete ethnic-cleansing objectives.  In Bosnia, 
too, the various entity leaders attempted to pass laws that would pre-
vent ethnically undesirable people from reclaiming their property.  
But in Bosnia these laws were overturned by the High Representative 
once the members of the IC who were responsible for protecting hu-
man rights explained the undemocratic nature of the laws and in-
sisted they be overturned.177 
173 For more on privatization laws in the Balkans, see generally Charles Philpott & 
Rhodri C. Williams, The Dayton Dialectic:  The Significance of Property Deprivation and Re-
possession in the Context of Ethnic Cleansing, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, 
supra note 4, ch. 6.  For more on the impact of privatization generally, see, for exam-
ple, SABEDASHVILI, supra note 156, at 15-16.  For more on socially owned property and 
corruption in the return of that property, see generally Massimo Moratti, Tackling Ob-
struction to Property Rights and Return:  A Critical Assessment of the Practice of Removing Hous-
ing Officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, su-
pra note 4, at 149, 150-52.   
174 Cf. Bogdan Ivanisevic, Legacy of War:  Minority Returns in the Balkans, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004, at 351, 361-62 (2004). 
175 Id. at 361. 
176 My first UNHCR post was that of Protection Officer in Knin, Croatia, the heart-
land of the Krajina Serb routing.  It served as a clear vantage point for viewing the im-
pact of the laws being passed in Croatia on the entire region in terms of displacement 
of persons. 
177 See generally Philpott & Williams, supra note 173 (discussing the property laws 
and the IC’s attempts to rewrite them). 
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Another consequence of privatizing apartments was that many 
women lost out.178  Prewar, the socially owned flats had been held as 
“occupancy rights,” something more than a lease but less than owner-
ship.  Occupancy rights provided a permanent or long-term right to 
remain without a right to sell.  Before the war, state enterprises owned 
many apartments, which they gave to workers or those who had served 
in the military.  After the war, with a housing shortage attributed to 
war damage and massive ethnic displacement, establishing an occu-
pancy right became extremely complex and was regularly subjected to 
manipulation by nationalists. 
The property laws that were rewritten multiple times in Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Serbia, often with negative consequences for the “undesir-
able” ethnic minority in that particular region, also had negative conse-
quences for women.  This was particularly true for single women.  For 
example, the Law on the Sale of Apartments in Bosnia allowed for a re-
duction in the purchase price of an apartment based on the number of 
years the buyer had worked.179  It also allowed spouses to combine their 
years of work to increase the deduction, but it did not allow a surviving 
spouse to combine working years with those of a deceased spouse.180  
Women, both by virtue of longer life spans and the wartime death toll 
among men, constituted the majority of surviving spouses.181  Young wi-
dows, with few if any working years of their own, and unemployed single 
women were disproportionately disadvantaged by this system, as they 
had few preliberalization work years to count.182 
Furthermore, the occupancy right went to the former soldier or 
factory worker, not to the family as a whole, which again left women at 
a disadvantage in acquiring their own flat on the privatizing market.  
Women often held no legal title.183  For a woman to claim a right to 
property in a divorce, for instance, without her name on the title, she 
178 In Bosnia and Mozambique, for instance, women had the most difficulty acquiring 
and holding on to land during the privatization process.  MARCIA E. GREENBERG & ELAINE 
ZUCKERMAN, THE GENDER DIMENSIONS OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 6-6 (2009), 
available at http://www.genderaction.org/images/GenderDimensionsPCR_2009.pdf; see 
also Walsh, supra note 133, at 7. 
179 Law on Sale of Apartments with Occupancy Rights, Official Gazette of the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina nos. 27/97; 11/98; 22/99; 27/99; and 7/00, art. 21 
(Bosn. & Herz.). 
180 Walsh, supra note 133, at 7. 
181 Id. 
182 See id. (“This particularly affects young widows, who have few if any working 
years of their own.”). 
183 Id. 
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was required to prove that she contributed substantial income during 
the marriage.184  “Moreover, men can transfer title to others (other 
family members, for example) so that women had no claim.”185  Given 
these practices, property privatization, the lynchpin of the neoliberal 
agenda in transitioning Bosnia from socialism to capitalism and com-
munism to democracy, exacerbated gender inequality. 
The total impact of economic liberalization has been devastating 
for women.  As one Serbian feminist economist asked, “How much 
does it cost when a woman really earns as much as a man?  How ex-
pensive is it not to take into consideration women’s leadership and to-
tal potential?”186 
V.  USING HUMAN RIGHTS “BENCHMARKS” AS A VEIL TO  
ACHIEVE A NEOLIBERAL MARKET 
In order for Bosnia to be invited into the world community on 
equal terms with other sovereign nations, it must overcome its courte-
san-state status.  And yet, the terms that the IC has given Bosnia for 
entrance to the world community, and in particular to the European 
Community, are provided in the form of a checklist toward accession 
to the European Union.187  The list is created by the Council of Eu-
rope, a European organization concerned with human rights, and 
therefore consists primarily of human rights concerns.188  Bosnia’s task 
in ridding itself of pawn status while slavishly following a checklist is a 
troubled one. 
Notably, to check off a box on the list requires not the actualization 
of the human right in question (minority rights or gender equity, for 
instance), but the appearance of such protections, typically in the form 
of laws requiring the protection of such rights.  Bosnia must pass the 
requisite laws; however, no one checks to ensure that the laws are sub-
184 Id. 
185 Id.  There are also arguments, beyond the scope of this Article, that war itself 
disproportionately impacts women and that this was particularly true of the Balkan 
conflict.  The primary impact areas, in addition to human trafficking, concerned dis-
placement, because women locate so much of their lives around “the home,” because 
of the increase in domestic violence, and because of girls dropping out of school in 
higher numbers than men.  See Walsh, supra note 133, at 3. 
186 Kuzmanovic, supra note 122. 
187 See European Comm’n, Accession Criteria, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
188 See ALLEN F. TATHAM, ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 214-18 (2009) 
(describing the role of the Council of Europe in formulating human rights criteria for 
accession to the European Union). 
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sequently implemented or enforced.  Of course, the fact that the list 
merely asks for a law, without enforcement, does not in and of itself 
mean that this is a bad approach.  On the contrary, the incentive to 
join the European Union has probably been more of a catalyst for the 
protection of the human rights of citizens and guests of Croatia, Bos-
nia, and Serbia than any other carrot or stick. 
The other goal of the accession list is the economic liberalization of 
the states in question.  This is due in part to most sovereign states in to-
day’s world community believing in a link between the protection of 
human rights and a liberal economy, despite ample evidence that se-
vere labor exploitation and labor discrimination are staples of many 
liberal economies.  The insistence on economic liberalization is also in 
part because the liberal states of the world community are in the busi-
ness of promoting their own companies and industries.  They hope to 
quickly enter the newly privatizing countries and be the first on the 
ground to exploit whatever business opportunities and natural re-
sources might exist.189  Ironically, liberalized states share this behavior 
with notably less liberalized states, like China and Russia, which also 
rush in to fill the vacuum with their industries and snatch up any natu-
ral resources that might be for sale.  In this respect, the common factor 
is economic self-interest, not the goal of liberalizing the economy of the 
transitioning state.  The people being transitioned are caught in the 
middle.190  Finally, western states impose the checklist because they see a 
189 For example, Western governments believed that there were oil deposits in 
parts of Bosnia and made sure that those regions were under U.S. control—Amoco was 
on the ground in 1996 to make assessments.  Additionally, the World Bank verified 
“substantial petroleum fields in the Serb-held part of Croatia.”  Michel Chossudovsky, 
Dismantling Former Yugoslavia, Recolonising Bosnia, 7 DEV. PRAC. 375, 382 (1997) (quot-
ing Frank Viviano & Kenneth Howe, Bosnia Leaders Say Nation Sits atop Oil Fields, S.F. 
CHRON., Aug. 28, 1995, at A1).  Western governments have shown greater interest in 
gaining access to potential strategic natural resources than in committing resources for 
rebuilding Bosnia.  When the World Bank loaned money to Croatia after it seceded 
from the former Yugoslavia, it “demanded a Croatian capital market structured to 
heighten the penetration of Western institutional investors and brokerage firms.”  Id. 
at 379.  “[T]he occupation of Yugoslavia suited the global strategic needs of the United 
States once it saw that the Europeans had made a big mess, breaking up a country and 
not being able to deal with it.  Then they went to show the Europeans that ‘we are still 
around and we are the power here.’”  Interview with Tariq Ali, supra note 145.  
190 See Interview with Tariq Ali, supra note 145 (“[N]eoliberal economic policies 
are being implemented at a vastly accelerated pace throughout the Balkans.  Most of 
the population, whatever their political orientation, are caught between what in Serbia 
are now called the ‘tajkuns’ (tycoons), that is the new term for these local tycoons who 
have profited off of all the instability, and, on the other hand, foreign multinational 
capital.”); see also Chossudovsky, supra note 189, at 379 (noting that a precondition for 
the massive loans Croatia borrowed from the IMF just after it seceded from the Former 
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link between politically safe neighbors, political partners, and libera-
lized economies.  Capitalist states are safe to deal with and engage with 
in world politics, they believe; socialist states are not.191 
When the IC negotiated the peace at Dayton, it ensured that its 
economic interests would be protected.  Feminists and antineoliberal 
thinkers have identified the self-interest of the donor countries impos-
ing the standards as a problem, arguing that women’s rights discourse, 
when it was discussed at all, was being manipulated by the most zealous 
proponents of the free market.192  In fact, gender and “gender main-
streaming” are regular components of the accession checklists.193  The 
premise of the neoliberal doctrine is to combine the notions of social 
justice and a free market economy.  At its best, the goal would be to 
bring about social justice—creating or fostering a free market economy 
would merely be one possible tool in carrying out that mission of secur-
ing social justice.  Instead, the tail is wagging the dog.  The goal, as seen 
by the IC in Bosnia, is the free market economy—sometimes renamed 
“democratization”—intimating that, to most western donor countries, 
democracy and a free market economy are synonymous. 
Filtered through the thinking of the IC around the creation of 
and support for Arizona Market, social justice, or “human rights,” be-
came a nice by-product of the free market.  It was believed that “if we 
build this market, ethnicities might get along.”  Later, some members 
of the IC carried it further and began to act as if the free market had 
the power to actually correct for social injustice or human rights viola-
Yugoslavia was a series of “economic reforms” that resulted in plant closures and bank-
ruptcies, driving wages to abysmally low levels).  The unemployment rate increased 
from 15.5% in 1991 to 19.1% in 1994, while Croatia dismembered its large formerly 
state-owned utilities.  Id.   
191 See Chossudovsky, supra note 189, at 376 (“Despite Belgrade’s political non-
alignment and extensive trading relations with the USA and the then European Com-
munity, the Reagan Administration had targeted the Yugoslav economy . . . ‘to pro-
mote a “quiet revolution” to overthrow Communist governments and parties’, while 
reintegrating the countries of Eastern Europe into the orbit of the world market.” 
(quoting Gervasi, supra note 117, at 42)).  Chossudovsky further argues that the econ-
omy of Yugoslavia failed before the war because of the success of western policies.  Id.; 
see also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FROM TRANSITION TO PARTNERSHIP:  A STRATEGIC 
FRAMEWORK FOR USAID PROGRAMS IN EUROPE AND EURASIA 2 (1999) (“Americans 
benefit as the economies of nations in transition become more open.”). 
192 See, e.g., ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, SEXUAL DECOYS:  GENDER, RACE AND WAR IN IM-
PERIAL DEMOCRACY 97-99 (2007) (describing neoliberal imperial feminism). 
193 See Marina Blagojevic, Gender in Serbia (connecting the process of providing a 
formal framework for gender inclusion and the process of accession, or “closeness,” to 
the European Union), in DEVTECH SYS., INC., USAID/SERBIA & MONTENEGRO GENDER 
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A DRAFT GENDER ACTION PLAN 8 (2005), 
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACG119.pdf. 
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tions.  At that point, the thought was, “the liberalized economy in Ari-
zona Market will create peace and harmony.”  When accession check-
lists were created, full of human rights goals, it no longer mattered 
whether those goals were implemented or carried out, only that the 
laws were written.  Now, the belief among the IC of postconflict inter-
veners seems to be, “if you create a free market, human rights will fol-
low.”  Unsurprisingly, feminists and antineoliberal thinkers disagree. 
CONCLUSION 
Of the unsavory and often criminal activity taking place in Ari-
zona Market, particularly of the sale of women for sex, one Ameri-
can Colonel observed, “[U]nregulated capitalism is a pretty rude 
sort of activity.”194  It is unclear whether, in so saying, he was sanc-
tioning such activity as inevitable or critiquing it as an unsavory by-
product of a liberalizing economy.  In either case, his words suggest 
some of the simpler recommendations for different approaches to 
postconflict reconstruction. 
The first is that the longer-term postconflict sustainability projects 
should be carried out by people with specific training in the area, who 
are mindful of how to achieve their goals without sacrificing women’s 
human rights, dignity, and physical as well as psychological integrity in 
the process.  This means that highly masculine military structures 
must overlap and consult with persons whose agendas are not limited 
to immediate physical security but rather are attuned to framing the 
issues as human rights and rule-of-law concerns. 
Second, the assumption that capitalism is always the right system 
and that liberalizing the economies of warring countries is always the 
right goal must be questioned.  The present lack of postconflict re-
construction doctrine, together with the push by interested govern-
ments and their diplomatic and military representatives to prioritize 
free market and military objectives, are leading to the unnecessary sa-
crifice of human rights and women’s rights in the aftermath of war. 
Perhaps it will turn out to be true that market liberalization is key 
to sustainable security.  At present, however, those unskilled in mak-
ing such assessments are operating on the assumption that capitalism 
will correct human rights abuses.  Regulation serves a purpose, offer-
ing protection against those who exploit newly developing markets.  It 
also serves to protect against criminal exploitation of labor, including 
194 ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 134. 
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human trafficking.  Consequently, market regulation should be consi-
dered a key component of postconflict reconstruction, even if it does 
not square with market liberalization. 
Moreover, it is not clear that market liberalization must be a com-
ponent of postconflict reconstruction.  While it is clear that those in-
ternational nation-states undertaking the role of contributing to the 
postconflict reconstruction in Bosnia were primarily capitalist econo-
mies, this demonstrates only that those nations have an interest in en-
gineering a new state to invite into the economic fold of free market 
economies.  It does not necessarily prove that an unregulated free 
market economy is key to Bosnia’s development into a country where 
the rights of all are respected.  Given this, the regulation of develop-
ing markets must be discussed, even when creating informal neoliber-
al market projects and experiments. 
Democratization as a priority should be similarly questioned.  
Striving for democratization as a goal in and of itself can mask the 
true objectives of postconflict construction, which should be to 
achieve stability by fostering the components of a democratic society.  
The focus should be on de facto, not just de jure, equality for women 
and minorities.  The IC’s fixation on democratization, with its prefe-
rence for the procedural trappings of democracy, would serve women 
far better by focusing instead on promoting and making central the 
primary characteristic of a democracy—equality of participation.  
Promoting principles of equality—equality of participation, equality of 
political voice, equality of representation, and equality of considera-
tion—would be far more beneficial to ensuring long-term and sus-
tainable peace than development of “democratization” per se, with its 
current focus on political rights, electoral systems, and institution 
building.  An IC truly interested in sustainable peace should focus on 
including all persons, particularly those who were previously denied 
or were without a true political voice, by including them in formal and 
informal power structures, markets, the labor force, and educational 
opportunities.  It should also work on guaranteeing truly equal prop-
erty and inheritance legal rights and maintaining social-welfare struc-
tures upon which women, particularly refugee and displaced women, 
are dependent. 
Democratization and neoliberalism on paper are not substitutes 
for securing human rights any more than the creation of a free mar-
ket automatically serves to achieve human rights protections.  Instead, 
human rights and the rule of law must be viewed as both the funda-
mental building blocks of postconflict reconstruction as well as the 
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umbrella under which all programs and practices are conceived and 
created.  Placing a neoliberal agenda and democratization at the pin-
nacle of the reconstruction agenda inappropriately distorts the goals 
of creating and maintaining a safe, secure, and sustainable peace. 
More concretely, it must be acknowledged and squarely con-
fronted that international interventions create the perfect storm for 
human trafficking.  The sudden influx of thousands of international 
men, far away from home, with both power and money far surpassing 
that of locals, can create a demand for women to be trafficked into 
the country for sex.  At the same time, economic-liberalization policies 
create a supply of women who are un- or underemployed in the eco-
nomically and politically transitioning country and are therefore uni-
quely susceptible to middlemen willing to exploit their desire to con-
tribute to the family income.  The conditions creating both the supply 
of and the demand for trafficked women are the responsibility of the 
IC, which therefore must not only work on prosecuting traffickers and 
protecting victims but must also be cognizant of how its policies and 
programs give rise to these conditions in order to check them before 
trafficking is carried out. 
The IC must acknowledge and take responsibility for the fact that 
its very presence creates a demand for abusive activities like human 
trafficking, while its neoliberal objectives create the supply.  It must 
not only acknowledge that this situation has occurred in the past, in 
places like Bosnia and the Congo, but it must also anticipate that such 
a confluence of circumstances will arise in the future and accordingly 
seek solutions and preventative measures in the present. 
 
